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FRANCHISE GOODWILL: TAKE A SAD SONG AND MAKE IT
BETTER
Robert W. Emerson*
The end of a franchisor-franchisee relationship is often like a divorce, with the
parties engaged in a heated battle over the ownership of the franchise goodwill. In
this debate, the same franchisors or franchisees often change their positions on good-
will ownership depending on current needs.
This Article analyzes cases in many areas of franchise law to determine why
franchisors and franchisees engage in such inconsistent reasoning, what the conse-
quences are for franchising, and if there are ways to produce a more logical and
efficient form of analysis and debate. In addressing the most contentious issues of
franchising, adherence by litigants and courts to a logical, systemic framework
could improve the resolution process for individual cases and clarify standards of
practice for all franchising matters. This Article proposes a standard intended to
reduce major stresses in franchise relationships-the sad songs of franchising-by
quickly and fairly resolving the ownership of goodwill.
INTRODUCTION .............................................. 350
I. GOODWILL ........................................... 351
A. The Franchise Contract and Maintenance of Customer
L oyalty ........................................... 352
B. International and U.S. Case Law Concerning Goodwill
in Franchising .................................... 358
1. Other Nations' Holdings on Goodwill ....... 358
2. U.S. Courts: The PMPA and Community
Goodwill or Trademark Goodwill ............ 362
C. Form Contracts and Opportunism ................... 365
D. Inconsistent Narratives: An Overview ................ 370
II. SUBJECTS OF DISPUTE ................................. 375
A. Termination ...................................... 375
B. Nonrenewal ....................................... 378
C. Trademark Infringement ........................... 382
D. Non-Compete Covenants ............................ 391
E. Antitrust Tying ................................... 394
F Vicarious Liability ................................. 396
G. Tax Cases ........................................ 398
H. Equitable Estoppel ................................. 400
* © Robert W. Emerson, 2013. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Sewanee: University of
the South; Huber Hurst Professor of Business Law, University of Florida. Email:
robert.emerson@warrington.ufl.edu. The tide of this Article is adapted from THE BEATmas,
Hey Jude, on HEY JUDE (Apple Records 1968).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
III. PROPOSAL ............................................... 406
CONCLUSION ................................................... 415
INTRODUCTION
"When I use a word, " Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less. "1
Like a marriage, a franchise relationship can end poorly. A
franchise "divorce" may produce long-term problems affecting the
parties' ability to conduct business. As in a dissolving marriage, the
franchise dispute often centers on ownership: who gets what? Sing-
ing the sad refrain of remorse, the buyer (franchisee) or seller
(franchisor) laments spending blood, sweat, and tears building a
business only to have the other party claim title to what was built. At
the dispute's core is a clash over goodwill that frequently exposes
glaring inconsistencies in the parties' understanding of their
relationship.
A willful or blind insistence on consistency is not necessarily the
best policy.2 For most areas of law and business, however, the incon-
sistent application of principles, perhaps based on the parties' own
self-contradictory narratives about the nature of their enterprise,
can diminish the reliability of individual or public expectations.
Facts matter. Accordingly, determining the particulars of different
narratives is essential.A In franchising, the "stories" that matter
usually revolve around fundamental, make-or-break issues such as
1. LEwis CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLAss, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 132
(1893) (emphasis omitted).
2. As my great, great, great, great-uncle, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82), famously
put it, "[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and
philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as
well concern himself with his shadow on the wall." RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in
ESSAYS 35, 47 (1841).
3. See ABRAHAM L. DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE DATA 28-30 (1973) (discussing Justice Louis D. Brandeis's staunch belief in, and
practice of, gathering facts as effectively the sole basis for judicial reasoning and decision
making). See also Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761-62 n.6 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring) ("It is the uncertainty about the 'facts' that creates most of the unpredictability
of decisions."); FELIx FRANKFURTER, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciay, in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCA-
SIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 3, 6 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr., eds.,
1939) (stating in an address in 1912 that "[i]f facts are changing, law cannot be static.").
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markets, territory, 4 competition, 5 and termination,6 with the crea-
tion, ownership, and value of the business frequently a crucial ques-
tion for the disputants.
The aforementioned value both arises from and is goodwill.
Franchisor-franchisee quarrels often involve shifting assertions
about the nature of goodwill. The franchisors and franchisees em-
ploy inconsistent arguments when confronting issues such as termi-
nation, nonrenewal, trademark infringement, noncompete
covenants, antitrust tying, vicarious liability, taxes, and other legal
topics. Indeed, the same dueling franchisors and franchisees often
switch arguments depending on the situation. A party to a franchise
contract in one context will assert that the franchisee purchased
specific rights, including goodwill, as part of a "franchise package."
In another circumstance, the same party will declare that goodwill
is severable from both the trademark and the franchise, and there-
fore, the franchisee purchased no goodwill.
Using case law to examine this inconsistent reasoning in argu-
ments about goodwill, this Article proceeds to analyze the debate
and propose a solution. Part I of this Article discusses understand-
ings of goodwill in franchise relationships in both international and
U.S. case law, as well as in franchise contracts. Part II analyzes a
series of common disputes among franchisors and franchisees to
highlight their inconsistent arguments about goodwill. Part III pro-
poses an allocation of goodwill to serve as a stronger foundation for
resolving future disputes. To further that goal, the author recom-
mends a standard intended to reduce these arguments by quickly
and fairly resolving the ownership of goodwill.
I. GOODWILL
Goodwill is the one and only asset that competition cannot undersell or
destroy.7
4. See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. Bus. LJ. 191 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOwA L.
REv. 1049 (1995) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition].
6. See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Termination: Legal Rights and Practical Effects
When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. Bus. LJ. 559 (1998) [hereinafter
Emerson, Franchise Termination].
7. JONATHAN YATES, ALL-TIME ESSENTIALS FOR ENTREPRENEURS: 100 THINGS TO KNOW
AND DO TO MAKE YOUR IDEA HAPPEN 60 (2009) (quoting Karl Ludwig B6rne, German satirist
and political writer (1786-1837)).
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A. The Franchise Contract and Maintenance of Customer Loyalty
Goodwill is the loyalty that a business earns from its customers.8
Franchise agreements almost always state that the franchisor has de-
veloped substantial goodwill, with the franchisee's use of that good-
will serving as a rationale for the franchisor to subject the
franchisee to many, sometimes stringent, requirements.9 The au-
thor reviewed one hundred fast-food, restaurant, and ice cream
parlor franchise agreements dated from August 2007 to April 2011
and found that 95 percent contain a clause in which the franchisor
declares it has developed goodwill for the benefit of the franchise
system.10 Controls over franchisee behavior are thus necessary to
maintain this goodwill.1
Examination of some representative clauses in franchise agree-
ments shows how much a franchisor typically requires a franchisee's
steadfast compliance with all contractual terms, including a
franchise operations manual, to maintain goodwill. For example,
the Atlanta Bread Company franchise agreement states:
Compliance by all Franchisees with the foregoing standards
and policies in conjunction with the use of Franchisor's trade
names, service marks, trade dress and trademarks provides the
basis for the wide public acceptance of the System and its valu-
able goodwill. Accordingly, strict adherence by all Franchisees
to all aspects of the System is required at all times.12
8. State Dep't of Transp. v. Cowan, 103 P.3d 1, 5 (Nev. 2004) ("While differentjurisdic-
tions vary slightly in their definitions of goodwill, the term generally is used to describe that
component of value attributed to a business's reputation in the community, loyal customer
base and ability to attract new customers." (citing 8A PATRICKJ. ROIAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 29.0[1l] (3d ed. 2004))); Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 3
(N.J. 1983) (noting that "goodwill is essentially reputation that will probably generate future
business"); DAVID LOGAN ScoTr, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT
TERMS FOR TODAY'S INVESTOR 170 (2003) ("A business may build goodwill over time as loyalty
builds among its customer base.").
9. HAROLD BROWN, FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES § 4.02(1) (c) (rev. ed. 2010).
10. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Phrasing: Strong Words, but Weak Faith (May 19,
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
11. See id.
12. ATLANTA BREAD Co. INT'L, INC. FRANCHISE AND LICENSE AGREEMENT art. 3.1 (2006),
available at http://134.186.208.233/caleasi/PDFDocs/%7B9E43FBDA-1737-47F5-BFC9-914A
2D3E7A7F%7D.PDF. See also HUNGRY HOWIE'S PIZZA & SUBS, INC. FRANCHISE AGREEMENT, Re-
cital D (2008), available at http://134.186.208.233/caleasi/PDFDocs/%7B822903F8-C54A-43
OF-878C-031D350E8355%7D.PDF; Two MEN & A TRUCK INT'L, INC. FRANCHISE AGREEMENT
(2008), available at http://134.186.208.233/caleasi/PDFDocs/%7BD4B275C7-7AAC-4DDI-
979F-2812B9F5E420%7D.PDF; BLIMPIE OF CAL., INC. TRADmONAL RESTAURANT FRANCHISE
AGREEMENT, available at http://134.186.208.233/caleasi/PDFDocs/%7B6D98F1B-5C9D-48
1B-B366-8F006EDB0620%7D.PDF. California customer goodwill law does not require
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The classic, locational definition of goodwill assumes that "old
customers will resort to the old place,"'13 and that it is the "disposi-
tion of a pleased customer to return to the place where he has been
well treated."14 In its more generalized meaning, goodwill arises
from or relates to the brand itself. This reputational goodwill is the
part of a franchise's value that "inheres in the fixed and favorable
consideration of customers, arising from an established and well-
known and well-conducted business." 15 As an example, for a
franchisee of McDonald's-probably the best-known franchise
worldwide-the goodwill is the value attributed to continuing cus-
tomer patronage' 6 (i.e., an expectation that "flows from the imple-
mentation of the McDonald's system and association with the
McDonald's name and trademark").17
Of all the characteristics of a successful franchisee-operated busi-
ness, customer loyalty may be the most important. Franchisors de-
pend on their franchisees' strong work ethic and fidelity to the
franchise system-be it to the way of doing business or, specifically,
to the business's key brands or services. In turn, franchisees and
franchisors need customers who know of and seek out that ostensi-
bly special product or service that their franchise system alone pro-
vides. Positive consumer opinions and brand loyalty are essential to
any successful business, including a franchise system.18
The franchisor's and franchisee's devotion to the ultimate prod-
uct delivered to their customers helps them to acquire and retain
customer loyalty. This is the goodwill of the system's owners and
operators toward the system's brand, which is then reciprocated by
franchisors to use this language. The same goodwill language would be used for that
franchisor's franchising agreements in other states.
13. Canterbury v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 223, 247 (1992) (quoting Hous. Chronicle Publ'g
Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1973)). The classic definition of goodwill
is "locational" goodwill: "nothing more than the probability that the old customers will resort
to the old place." Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment "with Goodwill": A Concept Whose Time
Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 812 n.217 (2005) (quoting Cruttwell v. Lye, 34 Eng. Rep. 129,
134 (1810)).
14. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. Eli Lilly Co., 205 F.2d 788, 797 (5th Cir.
1953) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915).
16. See Canterbury, 99 T.C. at 247-48.
17. Id. at 248.
18. In fact,
[r]esearch shows that brands can serve as viable relationship partners for consumers.
Relations between consumers and brands are characterized in terms of intimacy, inter-
dependence, commitment, love, and passion. Several studies confirm that consumers
incorporate brands into their lives as tools for shaping and expressing their own iden-
tities, and for perceiving the identities of others.
Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. Rnv. 83, 95 (2010).
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customer goodwill toward the system.' 9 Indeed, perhaps both
franchisor and franchisee should be seen as joint owners of the
goodwill. In Arnott v. American Oil Co.,20 for example, the Eighth
Circuit recognized a duty on the part of a franchisor not to act arbi-
trarily in terminating a local franchise contract, because when a
franchisee builds the goodwill of his or her own business, the fran-
chisee is concurrently building the franchisor's goodwill. 21
The problems of double-sided moral hazard (i.e., that both
franchisor and franchisee may behave opportunistically and engage
in wrongful behavior to maximize their own profits) 22 illustrate that
both a franchisor and its franchisees have an interest in the system's
goodwill. On the one hand, we have the problem of franchisee free-
riding off of the system's reputation. 23 For example, a franchisee
might lower its costs and the quality of its goods or services but
increase profits from a customer base that is principally one-time
customers, as with a fast-food franchisee along an interstate high-
way. For the short term, at least, its profits might rise. 24 In the long
term, it could lose a substantial amount of local goodwill.
19. As developed by leading longtime franchise lawyers, Brian Schnell and William L.
Killion, the five habits of a highly successful franchisor are:
1. Maintaining an undying devotion to the brand.
2. Balancing the interests of the franchisor, franchisee, and system as a whole.
3. Stacking the deck with "ace" franchisees.
4. Obsessing over the franchisee's bottom line.
5. Empowering the franchisee.
William L. Killion, The Five Habits of the Highly Successful Franchisor, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 2, 2
(2005). The first characteristic concerns conduct directly oriented toward generating
goodwill.
20. 609 F.2d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1979).
21. Id.
22. See Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, Doubl-Sided Moral Hazard and the
Nature of Share Contracts, 26 RAND J. ECON. 761 (1995) (showing that the benefits of
franchise-contract customization are low because of double-sided moral hazard).
23. In the franchising context, free-riding may be a temptation to some franchisees that
is only avoided by franchisor vigilance in monitoring the franchise network:
A franchisee who reduces the quality of the good or service he offers for a given price
might increase his own profits, yet by disappointing buyers' expectations he could
reduce by a greater amount the net returns to the common intangible goodwill as-
set-maintained by the franchisor and used jointly by his other franchisees.
Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy, Franchising. Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, S.
ECON. J. 572, 577 (1976) (discussing free-riding franchisees).
24. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements,
70 Am. ECON. REv. 356, 358-59 (1980) ("[T]here is an incentive for an individual opportunis-
tic franchisee to cheat the franchisor by supplying a lower quality of product than contracted
for. Because the franchisee uses a common trademark, this behavior depreciates the reputa-
tion and hence the future profit stream of the franchisor.").
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A franchisor, on the other hand, is at risk of opportunism.25 If a
franchisor can charge large, upfront franchise fees, substantial ini-
tial training fees, and other early lump-sum payments, it may have
no incentive to maintain product quality and reputation. It may
also choose to do little to oversee the work of its franchisees or com-
pany-owned units, fail to innovate and respond to market changes,
and carry out little, if any, advertising. An overly grasping franchisor
may simply require franchisees to pay more than a competitive,
market-based amount throughout the term of the franchise for
franchisor-supplied goods or services.2 6
The franchisor's interest in the system's goodwill is obvious. Di-
minished trademark values hurt the franchisor's ability to expand
its line of business. Franchisees also depend on customer goodwill
toward the network as a whole. Ironically, because franchisees
might try to free ride, all franchisees have an ownership interest in
the franchise system's goodwill. Otherwise, the "innocent" non-free-
riders have an asymmetric burden, including loss of profits and
property value to other franchisees or to the franchisor's opportu-
nism, with no corresponding benefit in increased systemic value
ascribed to each unit owner when the system's reputation rises.
It seems that almost any goodwill controversy between a
franchisor and its franchisee arises from the simple fact that the
franchisor has goodwill that the franchisee, in effect, purchases or
rents from the franchisor. The franchisee may think she now owns
and can further develop the goodwill, while the franchisor believes
that all the franchisee received was temporary access to what the
franchisor actually holds: the systematic goodwill associated with its
trademark.27 Problems arise when franchisees innovate or otherwise
25. See Antony W. Dnes, Franchise Contracts, Opportunism and the Quality of Law, 3 EN-
TREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 257 (2009).
26. See G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28
J.L. & ECON. 503 (1985); R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism in Multilateral
Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 210
(1994).
27. French courts have dealt extensively with the issue of goodwill ownership with re-
spect to franchise agreements. In 2010, the Court of Cassation ruled on a dispute between
Florelys Beaut6, a former, long-term franchisee (over fifteen years) of the perfume and
beauty products franchisor, Yves Rocher. Florelys Beautd argued that it had its own customer
goodwill (fonds de commerce). Yves Rocher contended that when the franchisee did not renew
its agreement with the franchisor, the franchise had lost any goodwill associated with the
franchised business. In effect, Yves Rocher contended, the franchisor took away, upon the
franchise's cessation, all goodwill. The franchisor argued that the franchisee sold the good-
will of the original franchisor by not renewing the franchise agreement. The French high
court held, however, that a franchise contract does not exclude the existence of goodwill
owned by the franchisee. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
com., Mar. 23, 2010, Bull. civ. IV, No. 09-11.029 (Fr.). This is a continuation of reasoning
found in earlier French cases. See Dubarry Le Douarin Veil, A Question of Goodwill, INT'L L.
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attract customer attention, if not loyalty, but the franchisor either
dismisses the value of such contributions or attributes them to the
system as a whole. Essentially, the franchisor believes that it owns
the systemic goodwill and any goodwill created as a result of the
expansion of the franchise, including local community goodwill de-
veloped by individual franchisees.
Just as American franchise law sometimes distinguishes between
types of goodwill, 28 French law separates the ideas of "national
goodwill" belonging to the franchisor and "local goodwill" belong-
ing to the franchisee. 29 "Local goodwill" must meet certain eco-
nomic, spatial, and legal criteria to be recognized by the courts.30
The franchisee must also run the business himself at the
franchisee's own risk,3' and local customers must be drawn to the
franchisee's location due to the franchisee's own efforts to attract
them.3 2 Finally, the franchisee must own the assets used to attract
customers, including the property where the franchise is located,
the stock, and the equipment.33 French franchisee advocates argue
OFF. (Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=0f07
e339-9231-4f7a-9186-54fDab907517 (discussing a French court of appeals case that held that
the franchisor owns national or regional goodwill, while the franchisee owns local goodwill,
with ownership centered on whether and where a party has invested money and taken risks).
See infta Part II.C.
28. In some states, the franchise relationship laws "may reflect the perception that a
franchisee also develops a goodwill in the business... [that] is separate and distinct from the
goodwill inherent in the licensed trademarks." Thomas M. Pitegoff & M. Christine Carty,
Franchise Relationship Laws, in FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 183, 210 (Rupert M. Barkoff &
Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008); see supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (concern-
ing locational, reputational, and brand goodwill). Both courts and statutes support the sepa-
ration of goodwill into different categories. See HAw. R~v. STAT. ANN. § 482E-6(3) (LexisNexis
2010); LaGuardia Assocs. v. Holiday Hospitality, 92 F. Supp. 2d 119, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
("[T]he franchisor is essentially lending its national goodwill to the franchisee [and t]he
franchise . . . generates local [customer] goodwill.").
29. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court forjudicial matters] 3e civ., Mar. 27, 2002,
Bull. civ. III, No. 00-20732 (Fr.) (known as the Trevisan judgment). See also Cour d'appel
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Chambery, com., Oct. 2, 2007, No. 06-1561 (Fr.) (another
unusually well-known case, called SA Andey c/ SAS Vanica).
30. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court forjudicial matters] 3e civ., Mar. 27, 2002,
Bull. civ. III, No. 00-20732 (Fr.); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Chambtry,
com., Oct. 2, 2007, No. 06-1561 (Fr.).
31. Franchisors carrying the risk also own the national goodwill. In SA Andey c/SAS Van-
ica, the French appellate court noted that the financial costs associated with a franchise re-
ward card, which recompensed customer loyalty to a particular franchise location, were
assumed by the franchisor and thus constituted "national goodwill" owned by the franchisor.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Chambfry, com., Oct. 2, 2007, No. 06-1561
(Fr.).
32. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court forjudicial matters] 3e civ., Mar. 27, 2002,




that these and other laws and practices regarding goodwill are
grossly unfair to franchisees.
34
In line with the franchisor's views, the franchise contract often
broadly defines the franchisor's rights, including express provisions
for an expansive interpretation of goodwill and the franchisor's ul-
timate retention thereof.3 5 Thus, the franchisor sets forth for itself
an ownership stake extending to all emanations from the original
goodwill, even though the new franchisee may have developed a
new idea or interest.3 6 Similar provisions are found in almost any
franchise agreement.3 7
34. See, e.g., MONIQUE BEN SOUSSEN, Les Clauses D'agrmment et de Prlemption, in LA PROTEC-
TION DU FRANCHISE Au DtBUT DU XXIhME SitcLE, ENvrEa RPALITP ET ILLUSIONS 167, 169-73
(Nicolas Dissaux & Romain Loir eds., 2009) (concluding that the franchisor can abuse its
powers under "right of approval" and preemption clauses to keep the franchisee from selling
his goodwill to anyone except the franchisor itself at a drastically reduced price, that neither
legislation nor court doctrine has produced rules to protect the franchisee, and that-unless
the contract mandates it-courts have not required the franchisor to explain its decisions). It
is regularly observed that under the French law of goodwill, the franchise system's or the
particular franchisee's supposed clientele are not as important as the individual qualities of
the franchisee (e.g., his know-how, the site of the outlet retail store, and how he orders
goods). The clientele were long considered an essential part of the goodwill when, as noted
franchise lawyer Dominique Baschet suggested, the clientele were actually more of a conse-
quence of that goodwill. See DOMINQUE BASCHET, LA FRANCHISE: GUIDE JURIDIQUE, CONSEILS
PRAcrIQUES (2005).
35. In effect, almost all franchisors control, or at least try to control, all goodwill some-
how related to the franchise system or even particular franchised units. Franchise contracts
contain express provisions reserving the goodwill to the franchisor. A recent survey of
franchise contracts showed that ninety-five percent contain a clause in which the franchisor
states it has developed goodwill for the benefit of the franchised system, with controls over
franchisee behavior thus necessary to maintain this goodwill (data on file with author). See
Emerson, supra note 10; infra notes 36-39.
36. For example, "The Big Mac@, Filet-O-Fish@ and Bacon & Egg McMuffin® have all
been developed from ideas generated by franchisees around the world. Indeed, the idea for
the Kiwi burger came from one of our franchisees in the Hamilton region" of New Zealand.
Franchisees: A Golden Opportunity, McDONALD'S N.Z., http://mcdonalds.co.nz/about-us/
franchisees (last visited July 3, 2012).
37. In effect, almost all franchisors control, or at least try to control, all goodwill related
to the franchise system or particular franchised units. Franchise contracts contain express
provisions reserving the goodwill to the franchisor. A recent survey of franchise contracts
showed that 95 percent contain clauses in which the franchisor states that it has developed
goodwill for the benefit of the franchised system, with controls over franchisee behavior thus
necessary to maintain this goodwill (data on file with author). See Emerson, supra note 10.
Nearly all franchise contracts contain clauses demarcating the franchisor's ownership of the
trademark and concomitant restrictions on franchisee use of the trademark. See Robert W.
Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor's Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72
N.C. L. REV. 905, 974 (1994) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses] (95 percent of
franchise contracts examined in 1993); Emerson, supra note 10 (95 percent of franchise con-
tracts examined in 2011). Large majorities of the contracts require that terminated franchis-
ees return to the franchisor all trademarked supplies, signs, stationery, forms, or other
materials. See Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra, at 974 (78 percent of 1993 contracts);
Emerson, supra note 10 (79 percent of 2011 contracts). Furthermore, a growing number of
contracts proclaim that all franchisee concepts become the franchisor's exclusive property.
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Because the franchisee pays a premium to "rent" the system's
goodwill throughout his franchise term, courts may rely on the
franchise agreement to conclude that the franchisor owns the in-
tangible improvements of the franchise. Therefore, the goodwill of
the franchisee may be taken for the franchisor's benefit.38
B. International and U.S. Case Law Concerning Goodwill
in Franchising
1. Other Nations' Holdings on Goodwill
The courts in the United States have been inconsistent in deter-
mining whether goodwill remains predominantly with the trade-
mark and the franchisor 9 or whether goodwill can be sold to and
developed by the franchisee as part of a franchise package.4 0 These
differences of opinion are also found internationally. For example,
an Australian court has noted that a franchise fee might, in effect,
be a payment for goodwill. 4 Moreover, a leading British franchise
lawyer has recognized that the initial franchise fee is attributable to
the value, for the new franchisee, of joining a franchised network
and obtaining the trade name and goodwill associated with that
network. 42
See Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra at 974 (only 3 percent of the 1993 contracts);
Emerson, supra note 10 (52 percent of 2011 contracts).
38. See Beitzell & Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., No. 87-2790, 1988 WL 66194 (D.D.C.June
17, 1988).
39. See Shell Oil Co. v. A.Z. Servs., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding
that the defendant's removal of the plaintiff-franchisor's trademark and cessation in the sale
of its products would cause irreparable harm from the loss to the plaintiff of brand-loyal
customers absent a preliminary injunction).
40. SeeArnottv. Am. Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 884 (8th Cir. 1979) (upholding ajury verdict
against defendant-franchisor for terminating plaintiff's lease and subsequently evicting plain-
tiff from service station without good cause). Franchisors typically contend that franchisees
simply are using the franchisor's goodwill, not developing any of their own-at least not
enough that the franchisee could sell it independent of the franchisor's own "developmen-
tal" rights as the originator of the franchise concept and system. As franchisee advocate Har-
old Brown notes, "[flor many years the major auto factories have flatly prohibited their
dealers from making any charge for the 'goodwill' of their dealership, confining them to a
selling price for their net tangible assets." BROWN, supra note 9, at § 8.05(4)(d). Under that
"no goodwill" approach, a dealer simply "buys ajob": he cannot make a profit when he sells a
dealership for his investments in reputation or other intangibles, and any profits the dealers
make before selling their dealerships are analogous to bonuses paid to employees. Id. (Tangi-
ble assets mean only matters such as equipment and inventory. Id.)
41. In re Floan & Copperart Pty. Ltd., slip op. at 56 (Fed. Ct. New South Wales Dist., Aug.
9, 1990) (LEXIS, Commonwealth & Irish Cases Combined File).
42. MARTIN MENDELSOHN, THE GuIDE TO FRANCHISINC 134 (7th ed. 2004). More gener-
ally, as a matter of good accounting practice, one may treat goodwill as paid for via the initial
franchise fee. Michael Sack Elmaleh, The Effect of Sales Terms on Goodwill, Risk and Return in
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In France, on the other hand, a franchisee's right to receive the
franchise system's goodwill 43 can drastically affect the franchisor,
with franchisees or other lessees of business locations having auto-
matic renewal rights if they are the true owners of the goodwill. 44
The answer to the key question-which party owns the customer
goodwill-depends on the court and the circumstances,45 with a
major underlying factor being franchisee autonomy or lack
thereof.4
6
Obviously, in France, the franchisors work hard to ensure that
their contracts clearly state that the franchisee has neither pur-
chased nor developed the goodwill for its location.47 It seems, how-
ever, that the trend of the French case law and commentary during
this past decade has favored the franchisee's rights to the franchise
goodwill, 48 and thus to lease renewal. 49 Indeed, a number of com-
mentators have interpreted a key French Supreme Court decision,
Transfers of Closely Held Accounting Practices, 3J. Bus. VALUATION & ECON. Loss ANALYSIS 1, 16
(2008) (emphasis added), available at http://works.bepress.com/michael_sackelmaleh/3
("[P]ayments based on retained clients or percentages of gross sales are more akin to franchise
agreements than equity investments in publicly traded securities. Practice goodwill has a posi-
tive market value as long as a buyer can convert the gross income stream from the acquired
practice into either additional compensation or additional profit.").
43. An inexact French term for business goodwill is lesfonds de commerce (generally trans-
lated as "business assets") or l'achalandage (also translated as "traffic").
44. Remi Delforge, New Trends in French Case Law: The Growing Recognition of the Indepen-
dence of Franchisees, 2 INT'L J. FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION L. 37, 42-43 (2000) (citing the
Decree of September 30, 1953).
45. See BASCHET, supra note 34, at 211-29; GILLES THIRIEZ &JEAN-PRRE PAMER, GUIDE
PRATIQUE DE LA FRANCHISE 88-90 (4th ed. 2004). There are many cases on point. BAsCHET,
supra note 34, at 212-22, 226-27.
46. Professor Didier Ferrier, the foremost commentator on French distribution law, has
stated that "as the franchisee's autonomy is almost nil, the franchisee must respect all of the
franchisor's standards and cannot develop its own customers," referencing the holdings of
two ordinary courts of original jurisdiction (tribunaux de grande instance). DIDIER FERRIER,
DROIT DE LA DISTRIBUTION 365 (6th ed. 2012). Limits on franchisee activities could mean that
the franchisee is not entitled to renew her lease of the franchised premises. Id. Still, leading
commentators find that French case law condemns this "solution" (no right to renew) be-
cause "even if the franchisee uses the franchisor's brand and applies the franchisor's stan-
dards, the franchisee engages in business, assumes the risks of this activity, and has the sole
'tide' to the customer." Id.
47. Interviews with Didier Ferrier, Professor of Law, Universite de Montpellier, in Mont-
pellier, Fr. (Oct. 7, 2010 & June 8, 2012); Interview with Alex Raymond, Legal Counsel,
Fhdhration franqaise de la franchise, in Paris, Fr. (Oct. 1, 2010).
48. BASCHEI, supra note 34, at 214-29. Thiriez and Pamier are more inclined to see the
goodwill issue as not necessarily leaning in the French franchisee's favor, but they mention
only three cases that support this view. Their backgrounds are as a franchisor-consultant and
a franchise-distribution business journalist, respectively, not as lawyers or law professors.
THIRIEZ & PAMIER, supra note 45, at 88-90. They simply conclude that the ownership of good-
will is a matter of much debate and case law. Id. at 345 (defining and discussing lesfonds de
commerce).
49. Professor Philippe le Tourneau discusses the matter extensively in his highly re-
garded treatises on French franchise law. PHILIPPE LE TouRNEAU, LES CONTRATS DE
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the Trevisan Judgment of 2002, to mean that the franchisee almost
certainly owns his own business, has rights to his customers, and-
inasmuch as development and retention of franchising clientele is
the core reason for the franchise system-possesses the sort of cus-
tomer goodwill that should insulate the franchisee from unfair
nonrenewals. 50
Though one can find similarities across borders-e.g., Canadian
franchisors evidently view goodwill and trademarks as American
franchisors do51-there simply are no international solutions, even
among nations with similar cultures and legal systems. As a business
matter, one may contend that the solution is to analyze features
such as the strength of the brand, the length of time a franchisee
has put into and, presumably, built a business, and the amount of
repeat business, among other variables, but the necessary legal stan-
dards are either absent or unclear. For example, the European
Franchise Federation, the leading trade organization for European
franchisors, has constituents from dozens of member states, with
those states failing to share a common view on even the most basic
franchise law matters, such as whether franchising should be statu-
torily regulated and, if so, how. 52
It is true that the European perspective tends to be more "pro-
franchisee." For example, a European Union study group drafted a
Common Frame of Reference with a proposed law providing in-
demnity for each party's goodwill if that party's business volume was
increased by the other party-even when the contract was termi-
nated for non-performance of one party and the franchisor would
FRANCHISAGE 148-51 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing, inter alia, the Trevisan judgment). The mat-
ter is not fully established in jurisprudence-including the commentary of the courts and the
professoriate-despite (1) Prof. Le Tourneau's eminent status, (2) the concurrence of other
leading commentators, see e.g., FRaacois-Luc SIMON, THtOR ET PRATIQUE Du DRorr DE LA
FRANCHISE 263-64 (2009), and (3) the apparent trends.
50. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., Mar. 27, 2002,
Bull. civ. III, No. 00-20.732 (Fr.). See also supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Lee Muirhead, Canadianizing Franchise Agreements, 12 FRANCHISE L.J. 103, 106
(1993) ("Franchisees should acknowledge that they acquire no right, title or interest in the
trademarks and that goodwill associated with the trademarks enures exclusively to the benefit
of the franchisor."). See also Peter Snell, The Canadian Franchise Agreement, in FUNDAMENTALS
OF FR.ANCHISING-CANADA 97, 128-29 (Peter Snell & Larry Weinberg eds., 2005) (noting that
a franchisee's tight to use the franchisor's trademark "will be restricted by such things as
[franchise contract clauses stating] the franchisee acquires no right, title, or interest in and
to the trade-marks and all goodwill associated with the trade-marks enures to the benefit of
the franchisor; [and] the franchisee agrees not to dispute.., the ownership or enforceability
of the trade-marks [nor to] attempt to affect the value of the goodwill relating to the trade-
marks"). This Article proposes a judicial recognition of franchisee rights to "local" goodwill
based on customers' desire to visit a particular business site. See infra Part III.
52. Mark Abell, An Uncivil Code in the EU?, LJN's FRANCHISING Bus. & L. ALERT, Feb.
2006, at 1, 6.
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be obliged to repurchase the franchisee's stock at the end of the
contract.5 3 Similarly, the International Chamber of Commerce, a
European-based organization, issued a revised version of its Model
International Franchise Contract (MIFC) in June 2011. Despite
MIFC provisions proclaiming the franchisor's right to goodwill
from the franchisor's trademark, the MIFC contains introductory
remarks indicating that "courts may in some exceptional cases find
a way to grant the franchisee a goodwill indemnity or similar remu-
neration in case of contract termination (or refusal to renew the
contract)."54 Some MIFC clauses restrict the forms of franchisor en-
croachment on franchisee markets; 55 give the franchisee renewal,
56
know-how, 57 and notification rights;58 extend the usual time frame
for franchisees to cure a breach;59 grant and afford the franchisee
53. Id. at 2.
54. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MODEL INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING CONTRACT 15
(2011) (discussing rules protecting the franchisee). Besides franchise-specific law, found in
thirty-five different countries, International Franchising Laws, INT'L FRANCHISE ASS'N, http://
www.franchise.org/IndustrySecondary.aspx?id= 4 58 7 4 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013), most coun-
tries have laws which more generally reach franchising. The International Chamber of Com-
merce's (ICC's) introduction to the Model Contract mentions three types of national laws
generally applying to contracts that may reach franchisees specifically: (1) disclosure
obligations applying generally to pre-contractual relations, as in Germany and Austria; (2)
treatment of non-businessperson franchisees as consumers (e.g., for purposes of the right to
withdraw from a contract); and (3) the above-quoted remuneration of terminated or
nonrenewed franchisees for their goodwill). INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra.
55. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 54, at 26 & n.16 (Model Contract Article
7.2) (noting that unless stated otherwise, the franchisor's grant of territory to the franchisee
effectively bars the franchisor from engaging the public through other channels in that re-
gion, such as the Internet).
56. Id. at 39 (Model Contract Article 25.1A (AB)) (providing that the franchisee may
have the right to an unlimited number of renewals regardless of whether the franchisor
consents).
57. Id. at 9 (Introduction-Core Elements of Franchising) (stating that the franchisor's
licensed know-how must be "continuously updated," including via development and constant
upgrading of a training support system).
58. Id. at 29 (Model Contract Article 12.1) (stating that the franchisee has the right to
speedy notification about changes to the franchise system and to be (i) free of royalties obli-
gations or other charges for making use of these systemic "improvements," (ii) able "to refuse
to conform to changes which imply unreasonable costs," and (iii) hold the right to terminate
the contract upon notice to the franchisor). The notice requirement that comes into play
before a franchisor may assign its franchise contract may be of special note. Id. at 42 (Model
Contract Article 29) (stating that the franchisor has the duty to inform the franchisee at least
ten days before the date upon which the franchisor is to transfer the contract and the
franchise system to a third party). Most buyers, however, would object to giving the fran-
chisee notice of an impending purchase. E-mail from John R.F. Baer, Partner, Greensfelder,
Hemker & Gale, P.C., to author (July 20, 2011, 9:14 EST) (on file with author).
59. The time frame for franchisees to cure any breach, even something very serious such
as a failure to pay royalties or other charges owed, is relatively long-thirty days. INT'L CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE, supra note 53, at 40 (Model Contract Article 26.1). In the United States
there are often shorter periods for failure to make payments. Emerson, supra note 10; Emer-
son, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 37, at 971.
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training opportunities; 60 and even create a franchisor duty in cer-
tain circumstances to refund the initial fee.61
2. U.S. Courts: The PMPA and Community Goodwill or
Trademark Goodwill
Even within the United States, courts treat issues related to good-
will differently. For instance, in Lee v. Exxon Co., 62 the court consid-
ered whether goodwill was part of a sale between the franchisor and
the franchisee. It noted that franchisor Exxon had conducted a
marketing study for a geographic area including franchisee Jeffrey
W. Lee, Sr.'s direct-supplied franchise in Florence, South Carolina.
Based on that study, Exxon "made an informed business deci-
sion . . . [to] convert all direct-supplied retail sites to distributor-
supplied retail sites." 63 Exxon decided not to renew its franchise
agreement with Lee but did end up offering to sell back the
franchise site to him for the same price as the highest bid Exxon
received. Lee chose to exercise this option, but then sued Exxon
for alleged violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practice Act
(PMPA).64 Specifically, Lee complained that Exxon made its offer
in bad faith, because the selling price included goodwill that he had
built up over time as the franchisee, 65 forcing him to buy goodwill
that he had developed himself.66
The court found that goodwill was not part of the sale, 67 and that
under the PMPA, a franchisor may terminate or decline to renew a
60. The franchisee is entitled to receive the franchisor's know-how, assistance (e.g., in
distribution and management), and training. INrT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 54, at
9, 21 (Model Contract Article 4.1(b) on know-how, training, and assistance), 28 (Model Con-
tract Article 10.1 on know-how), 29 (Model Contract Article 13.2 on franchisor-paid initial
training of the franchisee).
61. Id. at 10 (Introduction-the Need for Uniform Standards of Operation) (stating
that the franchisor should refund the initial fee less its expenses if it terminates a franchisee
who has not, even after training, risen to an adequate standard of operations).
62. 867 F. Supp. 365, 367 (D.S.C. 1994).
63. Id. at 368.
64. Id. at 366. The PMPA, enacted in 1978, instituted an industry-specific approach, con-
cerning termination or nonrenewal of gas station dealerships. See Petroleum Marketing Prac-
tices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 337 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (2006)),
Principles of PMPA interpretation may also be applied to non-petroleum franchise cases. For
a recent PMPA case involving constructive termination, see Mac's Shell Serv., Inc., v. Shell Oil
Prod. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1251, 1252 (2010).
65. Lee, 867 F. Supp. at 367.
66. Id. at 368.
67. The court concluded that the franchisee had not given any evidence for his claim
that goodwill attached to the sale. Id. It further noted, "Plaintiffs 'goodwill' theory is not a
recognized basis to vitiate or reform the sale to him." Id.
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franchise agreement without incurring liability to the franchisee for
goodwill. 6 The court held that when buying out or selling to a
PMPA franchisee, 69 a PMPA franchisor is not required to include
the goodwill built up by the franchisee in the fair market price of-
fered because the price need only be what a disinterested party
would pay. 70 The court reasoned that an "actual price, agreed to by
a willing buyer and a willing seller, is the most accurate gauge of the
value the market places on a good."71 Thus, to value the franchise by
looking at information other than the franchise's fair market value
would be speculative.72
In contrast to Lee, the court in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic 3
declared that a franchisee does create goodwill for the franchise,
68. Id. In Massachusetts' 2007-2008 legislative session, Senate Bill No. 142, which was
not enacted,
would [have] allow[ed] franchisees to form their own independent associations and
would prohibit franchise termination or non-renewal without "good cause." Sixty-day
notification of intent to terminate or non-renew would [have been] mandatory, and
the franchisor would [have been] required to repurchase inventory and supplies, and
to provide compensation for goodwill in most situations.
News Briefs, LJN's FRANCHISING Bus. & L. ALERT, Nov. 2007, at 7.
69. The latter was the case in Lee v. Exxon, where the franchisor did not renew the agree-
ment with franchisee Lee, but then offered Lee the right to purchase the franchise on the
same terms extended to, and for the same total purchase price offered by, the highest bidder
for the new franchise at the location Lee had previously leased. See Lee, 867 F. Supp. at 366.
70. Id. at 368 ("Congress has, through the PMPA, declared that where a franchisor fol-
lows the provisions of the PMPA, the franchisor may terminate or non-renew a franchise
without incurring any liability to the franchisee, including any payments for loss of alleged
goodwill."); cf Rhodes v. Amoco Oil Co., 143 F.3d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing
the requirement of a bona fide offer under the PMPA as an objective standard requiring
offers to be in the range of possible fair market values).
71. Lee, 867 F. Supp. at 368.
72. Id. (quoting Keener v. Exxon Co., 32 F.3d 127, 132 (4th Cir. 1994) for the proposition
that to look at information other than the agreed-upon price to determine some other sup-
posed market value, such as that for goodwill, "is necessarily speculative"). But from an ac-
counting perspective, goodwill may not be so speculative. According to accounting expert
John W. Day, goodwill is defined as
the difference between the value of a business enterprise as a whole and the sum of
the current fair values of its identifiable tangible and intangible net assets. Net assets
are the assets that are left after subtracting the company's liabilities. Goodwill is only
recorded when its amount is substantiated by an arm's-length transaction. Goodwill
cannot be sold or acquired separately but has to be included in a purchase with the
net assets of a business enterprise.
JOHN W. DAY, THEME: VALUING GooDwILL, REAL LirE AccOUNTING FOR NoN-AccOUNTANTS 1
(2008), available at http://www.reallifeaccounting.com/pubs/Article-ThemeValuing_
Goodwill.pdf Thus, an accountant would find that good will can be quantified into a clear
dollar figure.
73. 390 A.2d 736, 742 (Pa. 1978). In subsequent cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has never challenged that part of the holding. See Hamish v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 732 A.2d
596, 598 (Pa. 1999); Lasday v. Allegheny Cnty., 453 A.2d 949, 952 n.3 (Pa. 1982).
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benefiting both the franchisor and the franchisee. That is, by oper-
ating a gasoline service station, the franchisee knew "that his good
service [would] in many instances produce regular customers. He
also realize[d], however, that much of his trade [would] be at-
tracted because his station offer[ed] the products, services, and
promotions of the well-established and well-displayed name
'Arco."' 74 Because the franchisee's actions enhanced the goodwill
of the franchisor, the franchisee could expect the franchisor to act
"in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. '75 The
court further noted that the arbitrary termination of a franchise
relationship by a franchisor would allow a franchisor to, in essence,
steal the goodwill the franchisee builds over time.
76
The Lee court seemed to advance the point that some goodwill is
severable from the sale of a franchise, rather than part of a
franchise package that is sold to the franchisee. Essentially, while
the Lee court took the position that the franchisee bought only tan-
gible assets and not goodwill, the Razumic court recognized the
goodwill that the franchisee built and contributed to the franchise
also contributed to the goodwill of the whole business. 77
To add to the confusion, courts in recent cases have taken a bi-
furcated approach to determining the rightful owner of goodwill.
In Bray v. QFA Royalties LLC, the court granted the franchisee's
motion for a preliminary injunction and prohibited Quiznos from
terminating a franchisee for conduct that in Quiznos's "sole judg-
ment" materially impaired its goodwill.7 8 The court examined two
types of goodwill: (1) the "business goodwill," also referred to as the
"community goodwill," which the franchisees claimed they would
lose if Quiznos were allowed to terminate the agreement; and (2)
the goodwill associated with the Quiznos brand ("trademark good-
will"), which Quiznos contended would be materially impaired if
the termination were not immediate. 79 The court granted the fran-
chisee's motion, reasoning that to allow Quiznos to terminate the
franchise agreement would cause irreparable harm to the fran-
chisee's community goodwill.80 The court further found that the
74. Razumic, 390 A.2d at 742.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See generally Benjamin A. Levin & Richard S. Morrison, Who Owns Goodwill at the
Franchised Location?, 18 FRANCHISE L.J. 85, 116-17 (1999) (discussing the personal effort and
time, including customer relations, that franchisees often seek to develop their own business
goodwill; further noting several court decisions recognizing that franchisees may own local
goodwill).
78. 486 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1252, 1254-55 (D. Colo. 2007).
79. Id. at 1249-50.
80. Id. at 1249.
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evidence was insufficient to show that a continued relationship be-
tween Quiznos and the franchisee would materially harm Quiznos'
trademark goodwill.81 In so ruling, the court implicitly recognized
the ownership of the two different but related types of goodwill-
the "community goodwill" owned by the franchisee and the trade-
mark goodwill owned by the franchisor. 82
C. Form Contracts and Opportunism
"You f--ed up-you trusted us! '1 3
With cases such as Razumic and Lee, the courts have done little to
inform franchisors and franchisees whether goodwill is severable.
These and other judicial opinions84 have thus given rise to inconsis-
tent assertions by both franchisors and franchisees. Because of
these inconsistencies, franchisees appear to be at a higher risk of
being taken advantage of by a franchisor. Due to the unequal bar-
gaining power of the "take it or leave it" form contracts, 5 franchis-
ees risk losing to franchisors their investment of both time and
81. Id. at 1250-51. It should be noted that the decision in Bray was called into question
in SBM Site Services, LLC v. Garrett, No. 10-CV-00385-REB-BNB, 2010 WL 749823, at *1 (D.
Colo. Mar. 4, 2010). The court found that the leniency of the preliminary injunction stan-
dard set by Bray was "particularly disfavored" by courts because it seeks to provide the moving
party with all the relief it would receive following a verdict on the merits. Id. at *1.
82. In essence, the court ruled in favor of "community goodwill" when it found no im-
pairment of "trademark goodwill." This leads one to wonder if the court would have ruled
the same way if it had detected an impairment of trademark goodwill. Bray, 486 F. Supp. 2d
at 1250-51. See also Pirtek USA, LLC v. Zaetz, 408 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83 (D. Conn. 2005). The
franchisor, Pirtek, moved for a preliminary injunction to enforce a non-compete agreement
with Zaetz, an ex-franchisee, alleging that Zaetz violated the noncompete agreement between
Pirtek and Zaetz by illegally transferring goodwill to his son. Id. at 83-84. The court reasoned
that a new Pirtek franchise operating in the same territory as Zaetz's continued to develop
Pirtek's goodwill; therefore, any loss in goodwill caused by Zaetz's son opening a competing
business at the former Pirtek site was not tantamount to irreparable harm. Id. at 86. Like the
court in Bray, the Pirtek court seems to have recognized that a franchisee can further develop
a franchisor's trademark goodwill. Contrary to Bray, the court, in discussing Pirtek's loss of
goodwill and stating that such loss could be compensated with money damages, implied that
eventually all goodwill belongs to the franchisor. See id.
83. NATIONAL 1_AMPOON'S A~mmL HOUSE (Universal Pictures 1978) (fraternity rush
chairman Eric "Otter" Stratton's cheerful explanation to a pledge, freshman Kent "Flounder"
Dorfman, for why Flounder was to blame when fraternity members wrecked the brand new
Cadillac that Flounder had borrowed from his brother).
84. See, e.g., Arnott v. Am. Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1979); Bray, 486 F. Supp.
2d at 1247-51; Pirtek, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
85. Courts have continued to note that although franchise agreements are commercial
contracts, they exhibit "many of the attributes of consumer contracts." Nagrampa v.
MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit wrote:
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
money in enhancing the goodwill of a franchise.8 6 Indeed, modem
courts and commentators widely assume that almost no one-con-
sumers, businesspersons, or even lawyers and law professors-actu-
ally bothers to read form contracts, let alone negotiate over the
terms . 7 Empirical studies support this conclusion. 8  And while
remarking upon the extreme length and complexity of forms cover-
ing numerous, probably unfathomable contingencies, scholars have
noted:
[F]or most consumer transactions, the close reading and com-
parison needed to make an intelligent choice among alterna-
tive forms seems grossly arduous. Moreover, many of the terms
concern risks that in any individual transaction are unlikely to
eventuate .... In the circumstances, the rational course is to
focus on the few terms that are generally well publicized and
of immediate concern, and to ignore the rest.8 9
The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is characterized by a prevailing,
although not universal, inequality of economic resources between the contracting par-
ties. Franchisees typically, but not always, are small businessmen or businesswomen or
people.., seeking to make the transition from being wage earners and for whom the
franchise is their very first business. Franchisors typically, but not always, are large
corporations. The agreements themselves tend to reflect this gross bargaining dispar-
ity. Usually they are form contracts the franchisor prepared and offered to franchisees
on a take-[it-]or-leave-it basis.
Id. (quoting Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
86. The unequal bargaining power contains within itself "the seeds of abuse." Nagrampa,
469 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996)). In Nagrampa, franchisor MailCoups' parent company, Advo, was a large corpo-
ration that had $208,553,000 in assets and $1,016,492,000 in revenues in 1997. Franchisee
Nagrampa had a yearly salary of about $100,000 and had never owned her own business. Id.
at 1282-83. The Court found that MailCoups had presented the franchise contract on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. Id. at 1283.
87. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv.
1174, 1179 & n.22 (1983) (reporting that over the previous few years, he had asked many
lawyers and law professors "whether they ever read various form documents, such as their
bank-card agreements; the great majority of even this highly sophisticated sample do not");
Corneill A. Stephens, Escape from the Battle of the Forms: Keep It Simple, Stupid, 11 LEwis & CLARK
L. REv. 233, 239 (2007) ("[Sltandard preprinted terms rarely, if ever, are read by anyone
involved in the transaction."); seeREsTATEMENrr (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 211 cmt. b (1979);
cf Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
Rv. 55, 58-59 (1963) (contending, inter alia, that preservation of business relationships
rather than legal doctrine is the predominant factor in the behavior of businesspeople).
88. Rakoff, supra note 87, at 1179.
89. Id. at 1226 ("The ideal adherent who would read, understand, and compare several
forms is unheard of in the legal literature and, I warrant, in life as well."). The undetected
terms may later be revealed to the consumer in the form of bewildering fees and charges
seemingly thrust upon him or her without warning. See, e.g., Tony Pugh, Consumers Fight Ris-
ing Use of Hidden Fees, SEA--rLE TIMEs, Mar. 2, 2008, http://seattletimes.com/html/naon
world/2004254420_hiddenfees02.html (citing a 2006 study by the Ponemon Institute, an in-
dependent business-research firm, which concluded that each adult annually pays an average
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Franchisees are like these consumers, 9° especially as many are
not even represented by counsel. 91 With the franchise contract typi-
cally being over sixty pages long,92 state- or FIC-required disclo-
sures frequently being much longer, and lengthy and detailed
franchisor-issued operational manuals constantly being updated,
the paperwork may read like a multi-volume phone directory-al-
most as long and just about as exciting. It is rife with opportunities
for the franchisor to insert language that is advantageous to its own
purposes.
Once the franchisee commits to the franchisor-crafted contract,
"franchisor opportunism" 93 often results in a Hobson's choice for
franchisees: acquiescence to, and uneasy dependence upon, the
franchisor, or a separation from the franchisor accompanied by rel-
ative franchisee indigence. The objecting franchisees risk the termi-
nation or nonrenewal of their franchised sites, thus forfeiting
future profits-the only likely gains from their initial investments.
94
of $942 in hidden fees and surcharges). Some consumer advocates proclaim these fees, not
identity theft, are the "fastest growing white-collar crime in [the United States]." BOB SULLI-
VAN, GOTCHA CAPITALISM: How HIDDEN FEES RIP YOU OFF EVERY DAY-AND WHAT You CAN Do
ABOUT IT 6 (2007). Consumers outraged by so-called petty charges now increasingly do more
than vent: they sometimes join class-action lawsuits. Pugh, supra.
90. See. e.g., Sims v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 623 A.2d 995, 1003 (Conn. 1993) (allowing
parol evidence to interpret a general release, because the types of contracts arising out of a
franchise agreement are "more akin to a consumer transaction than a commercial
transaction").
91. Robert W. Emerson, Franchisees Without Counsel: Presumed Competent? (Dec. 11,
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing data from a 2009 survey of
franchisor counsel showing that the figure may be as high as 50 percent of all franchisees);
Andrew C. Selden & Rupert M. Barkoff, Counseling Franchisees, in FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHIS-
ING 289, 291 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008). The experience of
many franchise law commentators is that someone who decides to spend tens or even hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars investing in a franchise may still balk at spending a fraction on
hiring counsel, particularly if that person believes there is no value in trying to negotiate.
BROWN, supra note 9, at § 1.03[4]. In practice, laypersons are likely to view form contract
terms as "private 'law'-not subject to alteration or considered scrutiny." AmyJ. Schmitz,
Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEv. L.J. 37, 45 (2007). Schmitz further
notes that "[a]s a practicing attorney and now as a teacher, individuals continually tell me
that they view form terms like 'law' not subject to modification or challenge." Id. at 45 n.52.
92. Emerson, supra note 10.
93. Boyd Allan Byers, Note, Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise Terminations-
A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 IowAJ. CORP. L. 607, 621 (1994) ("The franchising structure
lends itself to franchisor opportunism. By exercising its termination power, the franchisor
can unfairly capitalize on local goodwill built up by the franchisee through its investment of
capital and labor. The franchisee's sunk investment also permits the franchisor to engage in
opportunism short of actually exercising its termination power, as the threat of termination
itself enables the franchisor to appropriate a portion of the franchisee's sunk investment for
itself.").
94. See, e.g., N.J. Am., Inc. v. Allied Corp., 875 F.2d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The fran-
chisee's often substantial specific investment thus creates an opportunity for post-contract
opportunistic behavior by the franchisor. The franchisor can threaten to close down the
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Thus, " [b]y exercising its termination power, the franchisor can un-
fairly capitalize on local goodwill built up by the franchisee through
its investment of capital and labor.... [T] he threat of termination
itself enables the franchisor to appropriate a portion of the fran-
chisee's sunk investment for itself."95 Indeed, the franchisor would
still benefit from local or community goodwill by having customers
continue to patronize the business establishment (now a company
outlet or a refranchised unit) that is still seen by customers as the
original, local licensee, even though the original franchisee's li-
cense has been terminated and the proprietor who helped to build
that community goodwill is gone.
This franchisee quandary is not limited to cases of termination or
nonrenewal of a franchise agreement. In Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc.
v. Smith,9 6 franchisees of the national restaurant chain brought an
antitrust tying action against their franchisor.97 After entering into a
long-term franchise agreement, signing future noncompete cove-
nants, and investing substantially in approximately four hundred
franchised sites, the franchisees contended that they had become
"locked in" to purchasing logoed products and other goods exclu-
sively from the franchisor.9s They alleged that the distribution sys-
tem failed to create opportunities for competitive product
distributors, resulting in supracompetitive prices for the logoed
products. 99
franchisee at any time regardless of the cost to the franchisee, and this threat may be suffi-
cient to allow the franchisor to divest the franchisee of the profits that would be produced by
the franchisee's specific investment.").
95. Byers, supra note 93, at 621. See generally Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 345, 356 (1985) (cited by Allied Corp.,
875 F.2d at 62); Scott D. Makar, In Defense of Franchisors: The Law and Economics of Franchise
Quality Assurance Mechanisms, 33 ViLE. L. REv. 721, 760 (1988) (cited by Allied Corp., 875 F.2d
at 62); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM.
ECON. RaV. 519, 529 (1983) (cited by Allied Corp., 875 F.2d at 62).
96. 34 F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
97. Id. at 463.
98. Id. at 463-64. In defining the concept of "locked-in," the court referred to PHILLiP E.
AREEDA El AL., ANTITRUST LAw 146 (1990):
[Areeda et al.] note that a franchisee may become "locked in" after investing in realty,
training, advertising, and development of goodwill for the franchise product, which
sunk costs may not be "wholly or even partially useful for any alternative occupation."
Thus, a later threat to withdraw the trademark can acquire coercive force after the
franchisee invests substantially and irreversibly in developing the franchise.
Little Caesar, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 488. But see infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text (noting
no lock-in on the facts presented in the Little Caesar case itself).
99. Little Caesar, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
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The plaintiffs in Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. also contended that
they were initially unaware that the franchisor's licensing agree-
ment granted a subsidiary the exclusive right to market logoed
products, such as cups, packaging, and condiments, to franchis-
ees.100 Since these franchisees tended to purchase all products for
their restaurant from that one supplier, they argued that the
logoed-products agreement effectively extended to all marketable
goods from the franchisor's distributor.10' This, they reasoned, cre-
ated an illegal tie between continuing the operation of the
franchise and purchasing all of their goods from the franchisor's
wholly owned distributor. 0 2
A special master noted that a franchisee might become "locked
in" to a franchise system after significant investments in real estate,
training, and development of goodwill, which may not be transfera-
ble to another operation. 10 3 But the special master ruled that the
distributor restrictions were either "generally known or easily know-
able" at the time the plaintiffs agreed to the franchise agreement. 0 4
Still, what if the franchisee sponsored local youth sports, bands, or
any number of other community activities at great time and ex-
pense 10 5 to develop local goodwill? Upon recognizing that such ac-
tions would be in vain in terms of building the franchisee's own
goodwill or public relations, the franchisee likely would choose to
spend money otherwise. This may be a good business decision in
terms of working with the franchisor, but it is a bad choice in terms
of encouraging community volunteerism and local philanthropic
works, at least from these fragile businesses.
100. Id. at 464-65. The franchisees, however, only became aware of the agreement years
later.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 464.
103. Id. at 488.
104. Id. at 506 & n.63 (implying that plaintiffs could have found out about distributor
restrictions beforehand from existing franchisees, since their contact information was given
in the offering circular).
105. For example, in Rockland, Massachusetts, two pizza franchisees from Rockland-
Domino's Pizza and Papa John's Pizza-have sponsored Rockland Youth Soccer. Rockland
Youth Soccer: Sponsors, ROCKLAND YOUTH SOCCER, http://www.eteamz.com/RocklandYouth
Soccer/sponsors/ (last visited July 3, 2012), See also Lexington Dolphins: Team Sponsor Savings
Center, LEXINGTON DOLPHINS, http://www.lexingtondolphins.org/SpcViewAll.jsp?team=ksld
(last visited Aug. 27, 2012) (listing among its sponsors franchised outlets in Lexington, Ken-
tucky for Cold Stone Creamery and bd's Mongolian Grill). Indeed, sponsors go to all manner
of charitable and community endeavors. See, e.g., Faulkner BMW in the Community, FAULKNER
BMW, http://www.faulknerbmw.com/dealer/faulknerbmw/community.cfm (last visited
Aug. 27, 2012) (indicating how the BMW auto franchisee in Lancaster, Pennsylvania sponsors
home building funds, athletic tournaments, the performing arts, highway litter control, and
the Junior League of Lancaster).
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Franchisor-franchisee quarrels over the ownership of goodwill
can be resolved in a systematic fashion, despite judicial indecision
on the topic. The parties can agree to settle current disputes, deter-
ring future conflicts about the interpretation or development of
goodwill, and a comprehensive resolution can occur via these nego-
tiations. 106 For example, after more than three years of talks, the
Southland Corporation's 7-Eleven franchise system and its fran-
chisee association reached an agreement on a new standard
contract in 2005.107 One of the main franchisee requests was to ex-
tend the franchise term. Although 7-Eleven had long abided by a
ten-year term-the usual length in all of its franchise contracts-it
consented to a fifteen-year one instead. 08 This gave franchisees not
only more time to recoup their investment, but also more time to
help increase the ongoing business's "goodwill"-something partic-
ularly important if the franchisee tried to sell its branch.109 The
franchisor evidently concluded that reduced flexibility was more
than compensated for by improved relations with longer-term,
higher-performing franchisees. 10
D. Inconsistent Narratives: An Overview
Whether arguing policy, seeking judicial relief, or soliciting pub-
lic support, squabbling franchisors and franchisees have often en-
gaged in inconsistent depictions of franchising, with each party's
portrayal of the franchising concept changing to suit each party's
purpose at that moment. Both parties tailor their arguments either
to advance the position that goodwill is part of a franchise package
sold to the franchisee or to posit that goodwill is severable from the
106. These systematic negotiations can be between the franchisor and a franchisee associ-
ation representing its franchisees. A listing of seventy-eight of the larger franchisee associa-
tions for seventy-five different franchised systems is the Franchisee Association Registry
maintained by the American Association of Franchisees and Dealers (AAFD). See Franchise
Association Registy, Am. ASS'N OF FRANCHISEES & DEALERS, http://id-portal.com/franchiseasso-
ciationregistry.php (last visited July 3, 2012). In addition, a listing of over seventy brand-
specific franchisee associations is maintained by the International Association of Franchisees
and Dealers. See Directory of Independent Franchisee Associations, INT'L ASS'N OF FRANCHISEES
& DEALERS, http :// www. franchise- info. ca / about / directory- of- independent- franchisee -
associations.html (last visited July 3, 2012).
107. Michael R. Davis, How 7-Eleven Developed a New System-Wide Franchise Agreement: Process
and Results, LJN's FRANCsc.NG Bus. & L. ALERT, Sept. 2005, at 1.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id.
110. Id. Of course, a franchisor's willingness to negotiate goodwill may depend on rela-
tive bargaining power. A franchisor may only be willing to negotiate if it decides that it will
gain from resolving present and future conflicts about something-goodwill-which often
seems rather intangible.
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trademark and retained by the franchisor, depending on the sub-
ject. This Article analyzes numerous issues that frequently arise in
franchise litigation that feature these inconsistencies, such as termi-
nation,"' nonrenewal, 112 trademark infringement, 113 noncompete
covenants,"l 4 antitrust tying,115 vicarious liability,116 taxes,117 and eq-
uitable estoppel.""t
Franchisors, for example, often assert that goodwill is included in
the franchise package (and thus, in effect, sold to the franchisee) in
cases involving termination, trademark infringement, antitrust ty-
ing, and taxes. 119  In other cases concerning the same, the
111. See, e.g., Uri Benoliel, The Expectation of Continuity Effect and Franchise Termination
Laws: A Behavioral Perspective, 46 Am. Bus. LJ. 139 (2009); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Selec-
lion and Retention: Discrimination Claims and Affirmative Action Programs, 40 ARIz. L. Rkv. 511
(1998) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchise Selection and Retention]; Emerson, Franchise Termina-
tions, supra note 6.
112. See, e.g., Craig R. Tractenberg et al., Legal Considerations in Franchise Renewals, 23
FRANChISE L.J. 198 (2004).
113. See Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 37, at 974 (listing the percentage
of franchise contracts that contain specific trademark language).
114. See, e.g., Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition, supra note 5; Peter ..
Kiarfeld & Mark S. VanderBroek, Law on Covenants Against Competition Shifts Toward Greater
Enforceability by Franchisors, 31 FRANCI lst L:I. 76 (2011).
115. See, e.g., Uri Benoliel, The Behavioral Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 41
RUTGERS LJ. 527 (2010); Arthur I. Cantor & PeterJ. Klarfeld, An Unheralded Stake Through the
Heart ofSiegel v. Chicken Delight and a New Climate for Franchise Tying Claims, 28 FRANCHISE
LJ. 11 (2008); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and Consumers'Beliefs About "Tied" Products: The
Death Knellfor Krehl ?, 45 FtA. L. Rav. 163 (1993) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchising and Con-
sumers' Beliefs About "Tied" Products].
116. See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors' Liability when Franchisees Are Apparent Agents:
An Empirical and Policy Analysis of "Common Knowledge"About Franchising, 20 Hovs-riA L. Rv.
609 (1992) [hereinafter Emerson, Franchisors' Liability When Franchisee Are Aparent Agents];
Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of F'ranchisors for the Torts of Their Franchis-
ees, 62 WAsii. & LEE L. RFv. 417 (2005).
117. See e.g., Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. Martinez, No. 01-3589-Civ., Bus. Franchise Guide
(CCH) 1 12,507 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2003).
118. See, e.g., Kerry L. Bundy & Scott H. Ikeda, How Waiver, Modification, and Estoppel May
Alter Franchise Relationships, 30 FRANCIlist LJ. 3, 4-5 (2010); Robert W. Emerson, The Fran-
chisee's lesponse to a Franchisor That is Curtailing Its Services, 3 SouT-iEAs-TFRN J. LEGAL STUn.
Bus. 93 (1994).
119. See infra Part II; Pappan Enters. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 806 (3d
Cir. 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction against franchisee use of the trademark after
finding that on "balancing the hardships to the parties.... any injury [the franchisee] might
suffer as a result of the issuance of a preliminary injunction is outweighed by the irreparable
harm [franchisor] would continue to suffer as a result of [franchisee's] non-consensual use
of the .. . marks"); Cal. Glazed Prods., Inc. v. The Burns & Russell Co. of Balt. City, 708 F.2d
1423, 1430 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We conclude that the desirability of the trademark and the
quality of B&R's components represented by the trademark are inextricably interrelated in
the consumer's mind in a manner that precludes finding that the trademark is a separate
item for tie-in purposes."); Vander Vreken v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 821,
825 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (granting a preliminary injunction after finding that franchisor "will
suffer irreparable harm to its reputation and goodwill" whereas the franchisee's loss may be
fully compensable through money damages); Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. Benita Corp., No. 97 C
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franchisor maintains that goodwill is severable and retained by the
franchisor despite the issuance of a franchise to the franchisee. 120
These shifting arguments have persuaded courts to come to differ-
ent conclusions, as in Lee and Razumic, and have thus led to erratic
results.
The inconsistent consequences cause confusion in the legal com-
munity and uncertainty about the outcome of any new case. 12
Sometimes, the inconsistency is found even in the very contract that
the franchising parties sign and later invoke in court. 22 These inter-
nal contradictions are not to be confused with the variance that
may exist between two or more sources-namely, between
precontractual statements and the written language in a franchise
agreement itself. The latter discrepancy has often been an issue in
franchising 23 and is usually a matter resolved via integration clauses
2934, 1998 WL 67613 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction against the
franchisee's use of the franchisor's name or mark after finding that the franchisee's uncon-
trolled use could result in irreparable injury to the franchisor's goodwill); jack Walters &
Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., No. 78-C-329, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18644 (E.D. Wis. Mar.
11, 1983) (granting franchisor's motion for summary judgment after finding that the
franchisor's trademark was inseparably linked to the franchisor-supplied materials and the
finished product); Int'l Multifoods Corp. & Affiliated Cos. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 25 (1997)
(holding that the goodwill inherent in the Mister Donut business in Asia and the Pacific was
embodied in, and not severable from, the plaintiff franchisor's interest and trademarks that
were conveyed to the defendant, and that the income attributable to the sale of plaintiff
franchisor's interest and trademarks constituted U.S. source income).
120. See Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 1978) (revers-
ing an order for summary judgment to allow further determination by the trial court as to
the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee where the franchisor defended a
tort suit by claiming that the agreement merely allowed franchisee to act as an independent
contractor with access to the franchisor's mark); Consumer Sales & Mktg., Inc. v. Digital
Equip. Corp., No. 95 C 5049, 1995 WL 548765, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1995) (granting
franchisee's petition for a temporary restraining order to prevent the franchisor from termi-
nating the franchise agreement); Canterbury v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 223, 249 (1992) ("We find
that petitioners acquired no goodwill that was separate and apart from the goodwill inherent
in the McDonald's franchise."); Lieb v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1231, 1238 (1974)
("Moreover, we are firmly convinced that Radio had no goodwill to sell. This Court has previ-
ously held that where, as here, a business sells brand name products pursuant to a nontrans-
ferable franchise which is terminable at will by the franchisor upon sufficient notice, the
franchisee can possess no goodwill, for goodwill, if any, is inextricably connected to the
franchise and ceases to exist when the franchise terminates.") (citations omitted).
121. See Gaylen L. Knack & Ann K. Bloodhart, Do Franchisors Nleed to Rchart the Course to
Internet Success, 20 FRANCHisr L:J. 101, 142 (2001) ("Some courts do not attribute all goodwill
to the franchisor. . . ."); Levin & Morrison, supra note 77, at 120 (noting differing legal views
on analyzing goodwill ownership-contract versus equity theory, for example); Clay A. Til-
lack & Mark E. Ashton, li'ho Takes What: The Parties' Rights to Franchise Materials at the Relation-
ship's End, 28 FRANCHISE LI. 88, 124-25 (2008).
122. See Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1989); infra notes 127-135
and accompanying text.
123. See Debra Burke & E. Malcolm Abel, II, Franchising Fraud: The Continuing Need for
Reform, 40 Am. Bus. L.J. 355 (2003); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol Evidence
Rule, 50 Am. Bus. L.J. (2013).
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and merger clauses; 124 it is also a topic now partially addressed in
the recent revision of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rule on
franchising. 125 But the parol evidence rule 12 6 cannot resolve
franchisor-franchisee disputes about varying terms in the same writ-
ing. Instead, other principles of interpretation, including perhaps a
common-sense understanding of boilerplate language, have pre-
served a franchisor's right to talk out of both sides of its mouth,
even within the same document.
Carlock v. Pillsbuiy Co.127 exemplifies this question of contract in-
terpretation. There, the franchisees quoted a recital in their
franchise agreement: "Franchisee acknowledges that the Franchisor
has created unique products of the highest quality, sold in the fin-
est establishments."' 2 8 The Carlock plaintiffs were franchisees of
Haagen-Dazs "shoppes" who argued that the recital created a legal
duty on franchisor Haagen-Dazs' part to distribute its products only
124. A written agreement's "integration clause" states that the contract, as written, "repre-
sents the parties' complete and final agreement and supersedes all informal understandings
and oral agreements relating to the subject matter of the contract." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
880 (9th ed. 2009). A "merger clause" provides that all prior agreements of the parties have
been merged into the written document. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 989 (6th ed. 1990). Con-
tracts often have a clause containing both elements of "merger" and "integration," and courts
rarely distinguish between merger clauses and integration clauses. Joseph Wylie, Using No-
Reliance Clauses to Prevent Fraud-in-the-Inducement Clais, 92 ILL. B11. 536, 537 n.1 (2004). See
also Wall v. CSX Transp., Inc., 471 F.3d 410, 415 n.4 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing both New York
and Pennsylvania law); Carousel's Creamery, L.L.C. v. Marble Slab Creamery, Inc., 134
S.W.3d 385, 395 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (referring to "the merger/integration clause contained
within the franchise agreement"). Indeed, the more recent editions of Black's Law Dictionary
now simply define "merger clause" by referring the reader to the definition for "integration
clause." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (9th ed. 2009); BLACK'S LAw DIC'NONARY 1010 (8th ed.
2004); BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1003 (7th ed. 1999).
125. 16 C.F.R. § 436.9(h) (2008) (barring a franchisor's use of integration clauses to dis-
claim authorized statements made in its disclosure documents or in the ancillary exhibits or
attachments).
126. This key tenet of contract interpretation bars extrinsic terms, written or oral, that
are agreed upon contemporaneous to or before a totally integrated writing. See JOSEPI- M.
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND Pi.RII.LO ON CONTRACTs 108-09 (6th ed. 2009). See also BI.ACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1227 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the parol evidence rule as "(t]he common-law
principle that a writing intended by the parties to be a final embodiment of their agreement
cannot be modified by evidence of earlier or contemporaneous agreements that might add
to, vary, or contradict the writing"). The theories advanced to justify the parol evidence rule
are (1) "[ilf the parties intend[ed] the writing to be final and complete, they intend to
supersede their prior agreements," (2) "sound policy requires that prior and contemporane-
ous oral agreements are suspect" if not included in the writing, and (3) that "the writing
deserves a preferred status against potential perjury" regarding oral aspects of an alleged
agreement. JOHN D. CAIAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACVS 187 (3d ed. 1999).
127. 719 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1989).
128. Id. at 802.
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through "upscale" retailers. By failing to do so, the plaintiffs ar-
gued, the franchisor allegedly committed, among other things, mis-
representation and breach of contract.129 In dismissing the
franchisees' claims, the court recognized that the recitals were
"only precatory language" meant to recognize Haagen-Dazs' past ef-
forts to create goodwill, and did not purport to impose any future
obligation on Haagen-Dazs.13 0
The Carlock court recognized that if the recitals were interpreted
as suggested by the franchisees, the meaning would conflict with a
provision in the body of the franchise agreements. 131 That provision
specifically reserves to the franchisor the right to distribute Haagen-
Dazs products "through not only Haagen-Dazs Shoppes, but
through any other distribution method, which may from time to
time be established."'' 32 Ruling for the franchisor, the court found
that this explicit, contractual clause reserved distribution rights
solely to Haagen-Dazs.133 It declared that the Haagen-Dazs franchise
agreement "does not bind the franchisor to any particular market-
ing strategy. Plaintiffs' claim that the franchisors breached the
agreement by distributing Haagen-Dazs through outlets that were
not 'up-scale' will therefore be dismissed.' ' 34 Such a claim could not
be sustained because the contract provision expressly reserved to
Haagen-Dazs the right to use any distribution method it might
establish. 135
129. Id. at 802, 816. The idea of goodwill directly relates to the retail "shoppes" and the
fineness of the product itself, which trigger for customers a highly positive association with
the brand Haagen-Dazs. Customers who frequent Haagen-Dazs shops arguably do so because
they expect to get a particular kind of experience that they attribute to Haagen-Dazs ice
cream and the surrounding social environment. This experience, the franchisees argued, was
being destroyed through brand dilution. See id. at 816.
130. Id. at 816. See BlAcK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1295 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "precatory"
words as "requesting, recommending, or expressing a desire for action, but usu[ally] in a
nonbinding way"; offering as an example of "precatory language" the phrase "it is my wish
and desire to").
131. Carlock, 719 F. Supp. at 816.
132. Id. (quoting the franchise agreement).
133. Id.
134. ht.
135. Id. See also Burger King Corp. v. Hinton, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla.
2002) (rejecting the franchisees' argument that introductory paragraphs to various exhibits
to their franchise agreement were evidence of Burger King's obligation to provide franchis-
ees %ith general support).
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II. SUBJECTS OF DISPUTE
This is a rotten argument, but it should be good enough for [tiheir
lordships on a hot summer afternoon.'l 6
This Article focuses on some of the most fundamental concerns
of franchising as they relate to goodwill: termination, nonrenewal,
trademark infringement, noncompete covenants, antitrust tying, vi-
carious liability, taxes, and equitable estoppel. In each area, one
can find inconsistent approaches with regard to who owns the
goodwill, franchisor or franchisee. 37 I now consider these areas.
A. Termination
This section discusses cases of termination of contracts in which
the courts found that the goodwill of the franchisor had been dam-
aged and cases in which courts found the same for the franchisee.
Returning to the discussion of inconsistent arguments used by both
parties, 138 both franchisors and franchisees alternatively argued for
ownership of goodwill depending on the circumstances of the case.
Similarly, these inconsistent arguments highlight the difficulties in-
herent in termination disputes that arise because ownership of
goodwill is unclear from the beginning.
First, in Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Buildings, Inc.,' 39 a
seminal case on termination, the franchisor argued that the
franchise agreement included goodwill, while the franchisee at-
tempted to persuade the court that it had simply purchased materi-
als from the franchisor, not goodwill. 140 Under the terms of the
franchise agreement, the franchisor, Morton Buildings, Inc., tied
construction-building material to the trademark by requiring the
franchisee to purchase certain materials from franchisor-approved
distributors, even at higher costs.' 41 The franchisee, Jack Walters &
136. SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HoME, THE WAY THE WIND BLOWS 204 (1976) (reciting an annota-
tion to a ministerial brief said to have been inadvertently read in the House of Lords).
137. Different approaches to ownership of goodwill are found across nations. For exam-
ple, although under U.S. franchise law ownership of goodwill is often unclear, French law
enables a franchisor to assign his "fonds de commerce" (the goodwill) to the franchisee.
Without the goodwill, the French franchisee could be regarded as simply an agent or em-
ployee of the franchisor. SIMON, supra note 49, at 261-64; LE TOURNFAU, supra note 49, at
149-51.
138. See supra Part II.D.
139. No. 78-C-329, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18644 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 11, 1983), cautionary treat-
ment affd, 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984).
140. Id. at *17-19.
141. Id. at *6.
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Sons Corporation (hereinafter Jack Walters), bought materials
from unapproved distributors and sold them under its own name
alongside the more costly franchisor product. 4 2 The franchisor ter-
minated the franchise agreement, arguing that Jack Walters had
damaged Morton's goodwill by associating an inferior product with
the Morton brand, 143 and the franchisee brought suit for antitrust
tying violations. 144
The franchisee argued that Morton's products were simply
materials, 145 because the franchisee always did business under its
own name, though it sometimes indicated that it sold the
franchisor's products. 146 The franchisor, on the other hand, con-
tended that the consumers of the Morton brand not only pur-
chased the tangible materials but also the representation of quality
that is associated with the Morton trademark. 147 Essentially, the
franchisor argued that the franchisee had purchased goodwill.
The court agreed with Morton, finding that Jack Walters had
purchased more than materials and had instead bought an insever-
able franchise package, 14  which included the quality of the
franchisor's trademark as well as the quality of the products the
franchisor's trademark represented. 49 The court took the view that
consumers specifically purchased the franchisor's product, regard-
less of whether the franchisee or another person or business sold
it. 50
In another termination case, Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-
USA, Inc.,' 51 brothers Sam and David Gorenstein defaulted on their
royalty obligations shortly after obtaining a home health care
franchise from Quality Care. 52 Quality Care terminated the Goren-
steins' franchise soon thereafter and demanded that they cease us-
ing Quality Care's trademark. 53 The Gorensteins ignored the
142. Id. at *8.
143. The franchisor is arguing that when the franchisee does not buy the building mate-
rial associated with the franchisor's preapproved material distributors, an unhappy customer
could associate this lack of conformity with the franchisor's brand itself. Id. at *8-9. As dis-
cussed below, the franchisor's image rests on more than just the quality of tangible material.
144. Id. at *9.
145. Id. at *27.
146. Id. at *6.
147. Id. at *27-28.
148. The franchise and its fundamental products are all one package, so a sale of the
franchise and the linked products cannot be a tie-in. Emerson, Franchising and Consumers'
Beliefs About "Tied" Products, supra note 115.
149. Jack Walters, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18644, at *20-21.
150. Id. at *32-33.
151. 874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1989).




demand, continued using the trademark, and sued Quality Care
seeking rescission of the franchise agreement. 54 Quality Care re-
moved the suit to U.S. district court and successfully moved for a
preliminary injunction. The Gorensteins then dismissed the suit
and refiled it as a counterclaim seeking rescission of the franchise
agreement, on the ground that Quality Care induced the Goren-
steins to accept it by false representations. 55
The appellate court ruled that once a franchise is properly termi-
nated, the franchisee is no longer permitted to use the franchise
trademark. 156 Indeed, the court soundly rebuffed the franchisees'
position, which it characterized as "holding the trademark hostage
as a bargaining tactic to pressure Quality Care into renegotiating
the franchise or settling the suit."'157 In effect, the court found that
from the start of the franchise onward, the goodwill associated with
Quality Care's trademark remained inseparable from that trade-
mark, with the franchisor having the right to maintain complete
control over both trademark and goodwill. 58
In a third termination case, Consumer Sales & Marketing, Inc. v.
Digital Equipment Corp.,' 59 which focused on loss of goodwill for the
franchisee, the franchisor reasoned that any injury to the fran-
chisee's goodwill was hollow, because any goodwill obtained by the
franchisee arose from preexisting business relationships between
the franchisor and its retailers. Indeed, the franchisor argued that
an alleged impact on franchisee goodwill was impossible because
the franchisee solicited purchase orders from the franchisor's re-
tailers, which had executed agreements with the ftanchisor. 60 The
franchisor notified the franchisee on August 1, 1995 that it
intended to terminate the franchise, pursuant to the franchise
agreement, effective August 31, 1995. The franchisee responded by
seeking and receiving a temporary restraining order (TRO) ,161
which the franchisor appealed. 62 In opposition, the franchisee de-
clared that it would suffer irreparable damage to its goodwill if the
court overturned the TRO.163 The court agreed and held that the
balance of hardship favored the franchisee over the franchisor. 64
154. Id.
155. Id. at 433-34.
156. Id. at 435.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 435-39.
159. 95 C 5049, 1995 WL 548765 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1995).
160. Id. at *4.
161. Id. at *1.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *3.
164. Id. at *7.
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Although the franchisor did not recognize any interest that the
franchisee might have in the goodwill of the franchisor's trade-
mark, whether purchased or developed by the franchisee, the court
disagreed. 165 Clearly, courts have inconsistent approaches to deter-
mining the ownership of goodwill in termination cases.
B. Nonrenewal
Most franchise agreements are set for a fixed period 166 and do
not grant the franchisee even a qualified right to renew the con-
tract in its initial form, subject to the acceptance of a new form
contract of the franchisor's choosing. 167 Even agreements granting
renewals can be problematic for franchisees, as franchisors may in-
sist upon new contract terms requiring further expenditures by the
franchisees.16
These pro-franchisor contracts often run afoul of practice and
law outside the United States. For example, in France, regardless of
goodwill concerns, franchise agreements sometimes state that they
are automatically renewed if neither party provides notice within a
certain period before the conclusion of the franchise term. 169 Even
without such a provision, if the parties continue to operate a
165. Evaluating goodwill in terms of calculating the damages to award a wrongly termi-
nated franchisee still may be a problem for courts. For example, one method suggested as an
approach for determining damages focuses on excess earnings as a means to measure good-
will. ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 287 (2005).
The earnings are "excess" in that they are those earnings "above those necessary to keep
resources invested in [the business] enterprise." Id. Professors Blair and Lafontaine note that
these earnings constitute profits, and "It] he capitalized value of these excess earnings repre-
sents goodwill." Id. While contending that this approach to computing damages "could pro-
vide a reasonably good approximation to the franchised outlet's value," they acknowledge
that its "major shortcoming" is that the franchisee's effort may not be properly accounted
for, that the franchisee must have included a salary for himself (instead ofjust taking a draw
of profits), and that salary must be "commensurate with the cost of [the franchisee's] time in
the calculation of his cash flows." Id. Otherwise, goodwill and the franchised outlet's value
will not be accurately decided. Obviously, there are a lot of "ifs" in these calculations and in
rewarding franchisees for goodwill. For example, especially early on in a franchise, how many
franchisees properly pay themselves salaries apart from taking occasional draws on profits, if
any?
166. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 37, at 973 (stating that 87 percent of
franchise contracts examined in 1993 had a set term of five years or more, with the median
term being fifteen years); Emerson, supra note 10 (stating that 97 percent of franchise con-
tracts examined in 2011 had a set term of five years or more, with the median term being ten
years).
167. Charles S. Modell & Genevieve A. Beck, Franchise Renewals-"You Want Me to Do
What?," 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 4, 4 (2002).
168. Id.
169. Isabelle MacElhone & Dominique Paillusseau, France, in INTERNATLIONAL FRANCHISING
LAw FRA-51 (§ 9) (Dennis Campbell ed., 2005).
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franchise beyond the term initially agreed upon, then the franchise
is "deemed to have been renewed indefinitely under the terms and
conditions of the original agreement." 70 Some nations besides
France also make it very difficult for franchisors to prevent a fran-
chisee from renewing his franchise.1 71 In Germany, for example,
(1) franchisors must show "good cause" to terminate a franchise
contract (akin to the franchise-relationship "good cause" provisions
found in some U.S. state statutes) ,172 and (2) most franchise con-
tracts are considered permanently renewable because they are not
fixed in length. A German franchise contract is considered renewed
under the same terms of the initial franchise unless one party
follows a lengthy and difficult process and gives proper notice to
cancel.1 73 Similar approaches may be found in numerous countries,
170. Id. at FRA-51 to -52 (§ 9). In Brazil, a franchisee/lessee who accrued locational good-
will also acquired, as in France, a statutory renewal right; however, franchisors succeeded in
eliminating that protection. Candida Ribeiro Caffe, Recent Developments of Franchising in Brazil,
2 INT'LJ. FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION L. 159, 164 (2000). Article 5 of European Community
Regulation No. 2790/1999 provides that a fixed period agreement that continues to operate
becomes an unfixed period agreement, even if the agreement does not include a special
provision.JEAN-MARIE LELOUP, LA FRANCHISE: DROIT ET PRATIQUE 334-35, 338 (4th ed. 2004).
171. Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Formulas for Success: Testing Requirements and
Goodwill Hunting (Dec. 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Impor-
tantly, however, the refusal to renew a franchise contract in France is not abusive unless done
in bad faith. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., July 5,
1994, Bull. civ. IV, No. 92-17.918 (Fr.). Only in cases of bad-faith refusals to renew will dam-
ages be awarded. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, com. ch.,Jan. 12, 2005,
No. 2005-277027 (Fr.). See also SIMON, supra note 49, at 325 (discussing abusive nonrenewals).
172. The sixteen "good cause" states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vir-
ginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-204 (2010); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 20020 (Deering 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 2552(a) (2010); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482E-6 (LexisNexis 2010); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 705/19 (LexisNexis 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-1(7) (LexisNexis 2010); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 523H.7(1) (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1527(27)(c) (West
2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14(3)(b) (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-404 (Lexis-
Nexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-50-1 et seq. (2010);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-564 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)0) (West
2010); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.03 (West 2010).
173. Olivier Cochet & Thomas Ehrmann, The Effectiveness of Contractual Self-Enforcement
and Implications for the Governance Structure of Franchising Firms, in THE ALLOCATION OF DECI-
SION RIGHTS AND THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN FRANCHISING: PERSPECTIVES AND EM-
PIRICAL EVIDENCE 28, 28 n.38 (2005), available at http://www.http://miami.uni-muenster.de/
servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-3205/diss~cochet.pdf (citing MATTHIAS STEIN-WIGGER, DIE
BEENDIGUNG DES FRANCHISEVERTRAGES: EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE STUDIE UNTER
BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN, DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN
RECHTS (1999) ("THE TERMINATION OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
wITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE Swiss, GERMAN AND AMERICAN LAw")). Several legal pro-
visions that constrain contract non-renewal by franchisors further protect German franchis-
ees. These civil and antitrust laws deal with the protection of franchisees' investments.
Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATr, Tiel I
[BGBL. I] at 2586, as amended, Dec. 4, 2008, §242 (Ger.) ("An obligor has a duty to perform
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such as Finland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Paraguay, and
Singapore. 174
While not advancing franchisee renewal rights to the extent ac-
corded in some foreign jurisprudence, some state lawmakers have
enacted legislation to protect franchisees from arbitrary
nonrenewal decisions by franchisors.17 5 At the federal level, the Pe-
troleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978 (PMPA) creates uniform
rules for petroleum franchisee terminations or nonrenewals, 176 pre-
empting relevant state statutes.177 As for state laws, they typically
according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration."),
§ 307 (noting that "[provisions in standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to the
requirement of good faith, they unreasonably disadvantage the other party to the contract";
that "an unreasonable advantage" may occur when a provision is unclear or incomprehensi-
ble; and that, "in case of doubt, [this disadvantage] is assumed to exist if a provision (1) is not
compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision from which it deviates, or (2)
limits essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that
attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopardised"); Gesetzgegen Wetthewerb-
sbeschr-ankungen [GWB] [Act Against Restraints on Competition] Aug. 26, 1998, BGBL. I at
2546, § 26, 2 (Ger.).
174. Emerson, supra note 171. See. e.g., Giuseppe Bologna &Julia Holden, Italy, in INTER-
NATIONAL FRANCHISING LAw, supra note 169, at ITA-15 (§ 2(131) (reporting that absent a
written notice of termination at least six months prior to the renewal date, the franchise
contract will be automatically renewed on a year-by-year basis, and that without anything to
the contrary in the franchise agreement, a nonrenewal would ordinarily entitle the fran-
chisee to compensation for loss of goodwill).
175. See FrankJ. Cavico, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Franchise Business
Relationship, 6 BARY L. REV. 61, 72 (2006). Some statutory rules permit franchisors to termi-
nate a relationship for a "compelling business reason." Id. at 73. An example of this might be
Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Carte Blanche International, Ltd., 888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.
1989), where the franchisee agreed to sell the franchisor's credit cards in several Asian coun-
tries. Id. at 261. The franchisor decided not to renew the agreement and cited as a reason,
among other things, the franchisee's unauthorized usage of the Carte Blanche trademark in
the operation of a separate travel business and the advertising for a franchisee-affiliated hold-
ing company. Id. at 262, 267. The franchisor argued that it was injured by the unauthorized
usage. Id. at 267. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, agreed with the
district court that there was no actionable breach of the franchise agreement resulting from
the alleged unauthorized use of the trademark. Id. ("The arbitrators concluded that any
breach that may have occurred in this regard caused no harm and was immaterial, and the
district court determined that they did not exceed their authority in doing so. We agree with
the district court."). It is unknown whether the court would have found that the franchise's
goodwill was severable and retained by the franchisor or that the franchisee had an interest
in the goodwill, because it never became a salient issue.
176. A franchisor governed by the PMPA must make any decision to sell a facility and
thus choose not to renew a gas station franchise "in good faith and in the normal course of
business." 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) (3) (D) (2006). Under the PMPA, the burden of showing that a
decision against renewing a franchise was made in good faith is on the franchisor, but in
opposing summary judgment, the franchisee must present evidence that the franchisor's de-
cision was a "sham, pretextual, or discriminatory." BP W. Coast Prods., LLC v. May, 347 F.
Supp. 2d 898, 904 (D. Nev. 2004).
177. The PMPA does not preempt all state law pertaining to petroleum franchises. Yonaty
v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 3:04-CV-605-FJSDEP, 2005 WL 1460411, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 20,
2005) (termination); Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 503-04 (Colo. 1995) (en banc)
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codify or sometimes enhance the implied covenants of good faith
and fair dealing that protect franchisees. 178 As one commentator
notes, "state legislatures and regulators are concerned that the
franchisor may be able to change or manipulate the terms of the
franchise relationship to the detriment of the franchisee, especially
after the franchisee has invested so much money, time, and effort
in franchise-specific development, design, marketing, management,
and training. ' 179 In effect, the franchisee expends significant re-
sources to create a valuable business-one perhaps with much local
goodwill-and thereafter worries that the goodwill could be lost to
the franchisor.
Cases comparable to nonrenewal may be those of franchisees
selling their business under the strong encouragement, if not com-
pulsion, of the franchisor. Again, matters of goodwill arise just as in
nonrenewal cases. In Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick v. General Motors
Corp.,180 the franchisor, General Motors Corporation (GM), refused
to credit the franchisee with any goodwill. 181 Here, the franchisor
convinced the franchisee, Frank Coulson, age sixty-five, to sell the
franchise to Glenn Ralph because the franchisee was "getting
old."' 82 Coulson later claimed that GM informed potential buyers of
his business's supposedly imminent nonrenewal, need for repairs,
and desperate desire to sell, causing the franchise's price to plum-
met.188 The franchisee further asserted that a potential buyer was
willing to pay more than just enough to cover the franchise's
tangible assets, which presumably also would include payment for
goodwill.1 84 Indeed, Ralph had offered to pay Coulson over $50,000
for both.18 5 The franchisor, however, would not permit Ralph or
(non-renewal). The PMPA, however, does preempt "state-law provisions related to the termi-
nation of a franchise that are not identical to the applicable PMPA provisions." Yonaty, 2005
WL 1460411 at *3.
178. Cavico, supra note 175, at 72.
179. Id. at 73.
180. 488 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1974).
181. Id. at 204. Although not specifically covering matters of goodwill, the federal Auto-
mobile Dealers' Day in Court Act provides that an automobile manufacturer may be found
liable for failing "to act in good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or
provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise with
said dealer." See 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (2006).
182. Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick, 488 F.2d at 204. The franchisee had been engaged in sell-
ing automobiles for decades. Telephone interview with F. Kendall Slinkman (Mar. 8, 2010).
Slinkman was the lawyer for the franchisee-plaintiff, Frank Coulson.
183. Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick, 488 F.2d at 204 (agreeing to sell his dealership assets, Coul-
son "authorized GM to solicit buyers," and "GM apparently 'spread the word' that Coulson
was going out of business").
184. Id.
185. While the franchisor would not let the franchisee sell for anything higher than the
tangible assets (because the franchisor did not want the franchisee to profit from goodwill),
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anyone else to pay more than what it considered to be the value of
the tangible assets alone: $50,000.186
Thus, the franchisor did not recognize any goodwill either pur-
chased from the franchisor in a franchise package or created by the
franchisee in the course of business. The jury had found for Coul-
son on the issue of whether GM maliciously interfered with Coulson
and Ralph's contractual negotiations, and GM successfully moved
for ajudgment notwithstanding a verdict." 7 The appellate court re-
versed this decision, reinstating the jury's award to Coulson in the
amount of $25,000.188 The appellate court reasoned that GM over-
stepped its privilege, which manufacturers have to a certain extent
to ensure that new dealers are financially sound, to intervene in
Coulson and Ralph's contractual negotiations. It agreed with Coul-
son that the sales price had excluded goodwill. 8 9 In support, the
appellate court noted that GM's own accountant testified that the
dealership's intangible asset value ranged from $35,000 to
$50,000. 190
C. Trademark Infringement
[Gloodwill [is,] in the law of corporations, a catchall category located
on the asset side of a company's balance sheet to make its assets appear
to equal its liabilities. It includes valuable intangibles, such as a recog-
nizable brand name.191
Ralph did pay for more than just the tangible assets. In order to get around this prohibition,
Ralph and Coulson made a real estate deal through Ralph's real estate company for $35,000.
Id.
186. Id. at 206.
187. Id. at 203.
188. Id. at 203, 207. Originally, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a two-to-one
decision, actually upheld the trial court's decision in favor of the franchisor. The opinion
noted, however, that the court reserved the right to reconsider the judgment; shortly thereaf-
ter, the court majority in fact did so. It withdrew the original decision and issued a published
opinion, id. at 202, favoring Coulson, telephone interview with F. Kendall Slinkman, supra
note 182.
189. Id. at 207 (excluding goodwill by imposing a sales price limit of $50,000-a price
giving no credit for any of the dealership's intangible assets). Indeed, after the federal suit
had been resolved in Coulson's favor, Coulson sued in state court those who allegedly had
interfered, along with GM, with his ability to sell his dealership. Telephone interview with F.
Kendall Slinkman, supra note 182. Those suits were settled with payments from the defend-
ants to Coulson. Id.
190. Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick 488 F.2d at 207.
191. D. ROBERT WHITE, WHITE's LAw DcToNNA vY 46 (1985) (emphasis added).
[VOL. 46:2
Franchise Goodwill
Trademarks are a key component of franchising and of the good-
will associated with a franchise.1 92 By itself, however, trademark li-
censing does not constitute a franchise. 193 Certainly when a mark or
a trade name commands high levels of customer recognition, the
brand's goodwill may become the decisive factor behind a fran-
chisee's choice of a particular business to own and operate. As a
prominent writer on trademarks opined, "(g] oodwill and its trade-
mark symbol are as inseparable as Siamese Twins who cannot be
separated without death to both."194 As discussed previously,
arguments about ownership of trademark goodwill are often incon-
sistent. Courts sometimes find that they need to protect the good-
will of franchisors against the misuse of the trademark and, at other
times, seek to protect the goodwill developed locally by the
franchisee.
In two trademark infringement cases, the franchisors argued that
goodwill was a part of the franchise package purchased by the fran-
chisee.1 95 In Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. Benita Corp.,t96 the franchise
agreement lapsed and the franchisor chose not to renew. 197 With-
out the franchisor's permission, the franchisee continued to use the
192. Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 345, 385 (2009) ("The centrality of the franchise trademark is reflected in
both law and economics."); William A. Finkelstein & Christopher P. Bussert, Trademark Law
Fundamentals and Related Franchising Issues, in FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING, supra note 91,
at 1, 4 (citing Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)) (noting that trade-
marks are linked to the fostering and protection of goodwill, that "[t] rademark licensing is,
in almost all cases, the cornerstone of a franchise system," and that "[firanchising, in its
simplest terms, is a more sophisticated form of trademark licensing").
193. FTC staff noted that trademark controls are usually "passive," dealing with matters of
quality control, while franchise controls are more active, covering the licensee's method of
operation, business location, outlet design, and business management matters. Darryl A.
Hart, Recent Staff Advisory Opinions, LJN's FRANCHISING Bus. & L. ALERT, Sept. 2005, at 1, 6
(summarizing an FTC Informal Staff Advisory Staff Opinion 05-1, dated March 2, 2005). The
staff therefore concluded that the limited controls of a hair-care trademark licensor were
intended to protect the integrity of the licensor's mark, control the mark's use in signs and
advertising, and safeguard the goodwill associated with the mark. Id. For example, when the
licensor simply wanted bills and taxes to be paid and laws followed, not to control all business
operations, the staff found that the licensor's insistence on the continued employment of a
particular manager did not rise to the level of control adequate to change the single trade-
mark license into a franchise. Id. As in the United States, trademarks constitute an important
element of the franchise package or business concept under French law, yet franchise agree-
ments are not solely comprised of trademark licensing. FERRIER, supra note 46, at 351.
194. THOmAs MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:2
(4th ed. 2012).
195. See Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800 (3d Cir. 1998). See
also Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. Benita Corp., No. 97 C 2934, 1998 WL 67613 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 10,
1998).
196. No. 97 C 2934, 1998 WL 67613 (N.D. Il. 1998).
197. Id. at *1-2.
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franchisor's mark.198 The franchisor filed for a preliminary injunc-
tion to prohibit the franchisee from using the trademark, arguing
that the franchise goodwill would be harmed by the franchisee's
unauthorized, continued use of the trademark, causing customer
confusion. 199 Here, the franchisee's continued use of the trademark
would only have affected the franchisor's goodwill if the franchisee
had maintained the franchisor's goodwill in the first place.2 0 0
On the other hand, Dunkin' Donuts' goodwill could be hurt if
an ex-franchisee that had been keeping up the franchise goodwill
operates its facility in a manner that does not meet the franchisor's
standards. In these circumstances, the consumer might be led to
believe these lower standards are not isolated to the franchise loca-
tion but indicative of the entire franchise. After all, "the consumer
is entitled to assume an equal level of quality of goods and services
sold through many franchised outlets using a single mark. The con-
sumer assumes that quality is as uniform as if each outlet were
wholly-owned and operated by employees of a single company."20 1
So the goodwill declines while customers draw the erroneous but
understandable conclusion that the national system's quality has
gone down, not realizing that the franchisee is now completely in-
dependent of the former franchisor. If the goodwill could be con-
sidered as leased, it would be severable and retained by the
franchisor, and the lessee-franchisee would not be able to impinge
upon the franchisor's goodwill. Therefore, without necessarily voic-
ing the specifics of the argument, the franchisor must have been, in
effect, averring that the franchisee purchased goodwill in an insev-
erable franchise package and was now under a duty not to injure
that goodwill once the franchise agreement came to an end.
198. Id. at *2.
199. Id. at *5 ("The public has associated Dunkin' Donuts' marks, trade name, and trade
dress exclusively with Dunkin' Donuts' shops and products because of Dunkin' Donuts exten-
sive sales, advertising, and promotion. . . . Dunkin' Donuts argues that its reputation and
goodwill will be damaged by Benita's continued unauthorized operation."). As noted in
Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989), discussed
supra notes 151-158 and accompanying text, a trademark identifies the product, and the
mark's owner has a duty to ensure quality control for the goods provided under that
trademark.
200. Importantly, the franchisor's goodwill may also be damaged by third parties, such as
consumers. For example, a dissatisfied consumer may tell all of her friends about her "bad"
experience at the franchised store. Her friends, in turn, may refuse to patronize the local
store or any other store in the franchise system. Thus, the overall goodwill of the franchise is
tarnished.
201. McCARThY, supra note 194, at § 3:11.
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The court in Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. Benita Corp. concluded that
because the franchisor no longer had control202 of the former fran-
chisee's operation of a donut shop, there would inevitably be harm
to Dunkin' Donuts' reputation and goodwill that "is not easily cal-
culable in monetary terms. '" 20 3 When the franchisee asserted that
the preliminary injunction would rob him of hard labor and invest-
ment, presumably including the building of local goodwill, the
court declared that if the franchisee prevailed, then profit, loss, and
investment would be easily calculated in monetary terms-in con-
trast to the difficulty of calculating goodwill.20 4 It seems that when
the court granted Dunkin' Donuts' preliminary injunction, the
court may have seen the "local" goodwill as severable from the
franchise package. Rather than purchasing the goodwill, the fran-
chisee may therefore have merely leased that goodwill for the
length of its franchise agreement.20 5 While the termination of the
franchised site would end this lease, the cessation likely would not
have been conveyed to the franchise system's loyal customers, espe-
cially if the ex-franchisee continued using the franchisor's marks.
The franchisor may have been seeking to protect the goodwill asso-
ciated with those marks in case the ex-franchisee operated the site
below the franchise system standards.
Typically, franchisors have sought to prevent franchisees and ex-
franchisees from tarnishing their goodwill and trademarks.206 In an-
other case involving the Dunkin' Donuts franchise, the franchisor
accused the franchisees of failing repeated inspections that found
that food was stored improperly, the premises were unclean and
contained pests, sinks dedicated to hand washing had not been in-
stalled, the employees did not demonstrate proper hygiene, and, in
202. Under both U.S. and French law, the franchisor controls the application of its trade-
mark, name, and business plan. Under French law, however, it is not just the right of the
franchisor to do so. Rather, it is the French franchisor's obligation to control his trademark
so as to protect the franchise network from any potential injury to the reputation of the
franchise. FERMER, supra note 46, at 322.
203. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., 1998 WL 67613, at *5.
204. See id. at *6.
205. See generally Acme Valve & Fittings Co. v. Wayne, 386 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D. Tex.
1974) (citing Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 223 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D. Neb. 1963)) (drawing a
distinction between assignment and licensing of a trademark, in which the owner retains the
ownership of the mark while only temporarily granting limited rights to the licensee).
206. See Dunkin' Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. KEV Enters., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1324
(M.D. Fla. 2009); Quizno's Corp. v. Kampendahl, No. 01 C 6433, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9124
(N.D. I1l. May 20, 2002); Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. N. Queens Bakery, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 31,
39 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). Preliminary injunctions could be sought against a franchisee's or ex-
franchisee's nonconsensual use of the marks.
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one facility, there were "imminent health hazards. '" 20 7 In yet an-
other case, Dunkin' Donuts Franchised Restaurants LLC v. KEV Enter-
prises, Inc., the franchisees were accused of repeatedly failing to
supply a sufficient amount of ice cream in their combination stores
with Baskin-Robbins.20 8 Lastly, in Quizno's Corp. v. Kampendahl,
Quiznos charged its franchisee with repeatedly using unclean food
equipment and unapproved food products, as well as with other
violations relating to safety, sanitation, and store image. 20 9 These
cases demonstrate that even without holding any trademark inter-
ests, a franchisee's violation of the franchisor's trademark rights
could demonstrably hurt the franchisor's goodwill. Moreover, ex-
franchisees have even less of an interest in or ownership rights
associated with the franchise than do current franchisees. If an ex-
franchisee behaved similarly to the franchisees in the two Dunkin'
Donuts cases or in Kampendahl, the ex-franchisee's continued im-
permissible use of trademarks could drastically impair the true
owner's goodwill, regardless of whether that owner is the franchisor
or a current franchisee.
In Pappan Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardee's Food System, Inc., the
franchisor argued that its goodwill would be irreparably harmed if
the franchisee were permitted to continue using the franchisor's
trademark without authorization. 210 The franchisee contended that
it would be permanently injured if the court issued a temporary
injunction, which could result in a loss of goodwill that the fran-
chisee had already developed for the franchise.2 11 As in the cases
discussed previously, the court determined that goodwill applied to
the trademark and not to any specific restaurant. 212 The Pappan
court thus took the position that a franchisee neither purchases nor
develops goodwill. 213
207. N. Queens Bakery, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 36-38.
208. KEVEnters., 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1327.
209. Quizno's Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9124, at *5-6.
210. Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 803 (3d Cir. 1998).
211. See id. at 805-06.
212. Id. at 806.
213. See id. Indeed, use of trademarks cannot be justified simply as a means to protect a
franchisee's alleged goodwill. In Sparks Tune-Up Centers, Inc. v. Strong, No. 92-C-5902, 1995 WL
153277 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 1995), the Strongs failed to make royalty payments, and Sparks
terminated the franchise agreement shortly thereafter. Id. at *1. The Strongs continued to
use the Sparks trademark in signage and advertising, and Sparks sued for trademark infringe-
ment. Id. The Strongs claimed that the reason they continued to use the trademark was for
fear of losing goodwill. Id. at *6. The court ruled that the Strongs were guilty of trademark
infringement, which again implies that the trademark and goodwill are inseverable. See id. at
*6-7.
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In contrast, the court in Computer Currents Publishing Corp. v. Jaye
Communications214 apparently recognized that the franchisee had
"cultivated" goodwill through high standards and customer ser-
vice, 215 and therefore refused to grant the franchisor's motion for a
preliminary injunction that would have prohibited the franchisee
from continuing to use the franchisor's trademark. 21 6 Accepting the
franchisee's irreparable harm argument, the court reasoned that
the potential harm to the franchisee caused by an immediate termi-
nation of the franchise far outweighed any potential harm to the
franchisor.2 17 Specifically, the court held that the "[franchisee] is
likely to lose many of the readers and advertisers it has attracted
during its eight years of publishing 'Atlanta Computer Currents,' as
well as the good will [the franchisee] has cultivated."21 Thus, the court
gave credence to the notion that a franchisee has some degree of
ownership over the goodwill that it cultivated. 219
Sometimes, trademark cases arise in contexts more closely associ-
ated with other issues. For example, Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc.
v. Sheraton Franchise Corp.,2 20 one of the most celebrated cases
214. 968 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
215. Id. at 690. If it had been enjoined from publishing "Atlanta Computer Currents" in
the interim, defendant would likely have lost many of the readers and advertisers that it
attracted during its eight years of publishing "Atlanta Computer Currents," as well as the
goodwill defendant cultivated. This obviously would have been detrimental to defendant's
chances of successfully launching a new publication. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Computer Currents is discussed in Gaylen L. Knack & Ann K. Bloodhart, Do Franchisors
Need to Rechart the Course to Internet Success?, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 101, 142 (2001). The authors
discuss how disputes arise between a franchisor and a franchisee regarding the ownership of
customer data collected tlirough a franchisee's website that contained the franchisor's trade-
mark. Id. When the franchise agreement is silent on ownership of e-data, it behooves the
franchisor to assert that it owns all customer data because the data are collected through the
goodwill of the franchisor's trademark. Id. Not all courts, however, will take this franchisor-
owns-all-goodwill approach. Instead, they may attribute some goodwill to the franchisee, as
the court did in Computer Currents. Computer Currents, 968 F. Supp. at 690. Customer data is
collected through goodwill. It is possible that the customer data was collected through the
franchisee's goodwill, not solely through the franchisor's goodwill. Therefore, it is possible
that some courts, absent a clearly delineated contractual arrangement, will rule that the fran-
chisee owns the customer data.
220. 139 F.3d 1396, 1412 (11th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Camp Creek Ill. Camp Creek I (dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 231-233) was the franchisee's initial action against the
franchisor and related companies in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia. The trial court granted summary judgment for the franchisor, and the
franchisee appealed. See Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., Bus.
Franchise Guide (CCH) 10,775 (N.D. Ga. 1995). In Camp Creek II, on a petition for rehear-
ing, the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
manded for further proceedings. Camp Creek If, 139 F.3d 1396.
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concerning encroachment on franchise territory,221 also involved
trademark disputes. In 1990, the franchisee, Camp Creek, entered
into a series of agreements with the franchisor, Sheraton, which
permitted Camp Creek to operate a Sheraton Inn three and a half
miles west of the Atlanta Airport.22 2 Another Sheraton franchisee
already served the airport market; in 1993, Sheraton bought a Hyatt
hotel near the Atlanta Airport and began to operate it as a third
Sheraton hotel in that market. 223 This last hotel was franchisor
owned, and though each of the three hotels had a slightly different
name,224 Camp Creek argued that each of the three hotels clearly
was a "Sheraton" and that each competed against the other two in
the Atlanta Airport market. 225
The "Sheraton-Camp Creek" franchise contract provided no ter-
ritorial protection for the franchisee.22 6 It stipulated that the
franchisor would not grant any other license authorizing the use of
its names within the geographic area described on an attached
schedule that read "site only."2 2 7 While the contract schedule alone
could be read as permitting Sheraton to put other units in the same
area as the existing franchisee, the appellate court opted to delve
further into the facts. 228 It noted that while Sheraton's standard-
form license agreement contained language expressing Sheraton's
power to compete against the franchisee with company-owned loca-
tions, the parties had deleted this language from their contract. 229
221. The author's review of the Westlaw database reveals that as of September 1, 2012,
the case had been cited in twenty-seven different federal court cases and in seven cases aris-
ing in six different state judicial systems. It had also been discussed in thirty-one different law
review articles.
222. Camp Creek 11, 139 F.3d at 1400.
223. Id. at 1401.
224. Camp Creek owned the Sheraton Inn, the other franchisee owned the Sheraton
Hotel Atlanta Airport, and the franchisor owned the Sheraton Gateway Hotel Atlanta Air-
port. Id. at 1400-01.
225. Franchisor Sheraton argued that Camp Creek's profits had improved over time, and
thus it had not been harmed by any encroachment. Id. at 1405. The court concluded, how-
ever, that there was credible evidence indicating that Camp Creek would have been more
profitable if there had been no such competition from its franchisor. Id. For more on the
main topic arising in the case-franchisee territories and markets or the lack thereof-the
extensively debated and perhaps most litigated subject in franchising for the past two de-
cades, see Emerson, supra note 4.
226. See Camp Creek II, 139 F.3d at 1400. In France, territorial exclusivity is not an essential
element of a franchise agreement. SIMON, supra note 49, at 191. In 2002, the Commercial
Chamber of the Court of Cassation held that the lack of a territorial exclusivity clause in a
franchise agreement did not give rise to infringement of Article 1134 of the French Civil
Code. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Nov. 19, 2002,
Bull. civ. IV, No. 01-13.492 (Fr.).
227. Camp Creek II, 139 F.3d at 1404 n.7.




The parties disagreed about why the provision was removed, but the
court seized on the resulting contractual silence as presenting a
case in which reasonable people could differ over whether Shera-
ton's conduct violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing.230
To answer this question, the district court noted at trial that after
the franchise contract's execution, the franchisor had studied the
hotels and their markets.2 31 The trial judge, in entering summary
judgment on behalf of Sheraton, apparently concluded that these
studies were meant to ensure that a new hotel in the same area
would not compete in the same market as the existing unit.2 3
2
Based in part on that postcontractual behavior, the trial court main-
tained that there had been no breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, because the franchisor had not acted to
destroy the fruits of the franchise contract.2 33 The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed:
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Camp
Creek, shows that [franchisor] ITT Sheraton's representatives
did not [conduct their on-site study in Atlanta] to evaluate
whether the new hotel would compete against the Inn [fran-
chisee Camp Creek]; similarly, ITT Sheraton's internal evalua-
tions of the project did not seriously consider the competitive
harm that might befall the Inn if the property converted to the
Sheraton flag.234
230. The Court noted that a summaryjudgment favoring the defendant franchisor might
have made sense if the franchise agreement had been clearer:
This is not to say, however, that Sheraton can never avoid a trial on the issue of its
good faith when it seeks to open a new hotel near any of its franchisees; Sheraton
need only include (or refrain from limiting and deleting) clear language reserving its
right to compete against its franchisees in its License Agreements.
Id. at 1405 n.12. The implied covenant, of course, may not be used to rewrite the express
terms of a contract. See id.
231. See Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 10,775 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (entering summary judgment for the defendant
franchisor) [hereinafter Camp Creek 1].
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Camp Creek II, 139 F.3d at 1401. Instead, franchisor Sheraton's representatives appar-
ently just looked at the Atlanta Hyatt property that it ultimately acquired and compared that
property to others it might acquire instead. Id. ("Various members of ITT Sheraton's staff
evaluated the proposal [to acquire the Hyatt hotel near the Atlanta airport], both at their
corporate headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts and in Atlanta, where they traveled to study
competitive properties. . . . [Franchisor Sheraton] maintain[s] that [it] never viewed the
Hyatt property as a threat to the Inn because Sheraton expected the property's connection to
the Georgia International Convention Center to attract predominately group business.").
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The Eleventh Circuit determined that summary judgment was in-
appropriate on the good faith claim and reversed the lower
court.2
3 5
On remand, the trial court still had to decide whether Sheraton
had denied Camp Creek the fruits of its contract. A key issue before
the court was the franchisee's allegation that Sheraton engaged in
reverse passing off (RPO), a classic form of unfair competition and
perhaps also of trademark infringement.236 RPO occurs when A
sells B's product under A's name.23 7 The franchisee claimed an in-
terest in the franchisor's name, "Sheraton," used along with the
term "Atlanta Airport.'"2 3s The franchisee further alleged that the
goodwill it had developed in using those two terms together gave it
a property interest for which the franchisor owed a duty to the fran-
chisee.239 Although it found no evidence of RPO, the court stated
that there may have been "passing off," which occurs when A sells
A's product under B's name. 240 Such a tort, also called "palming
off,"' 241 is a concern in all common law jurisdictions. 242 The court
affirmed that the evidence might show that the franchisor sold its
rooms using the goodwill that the franchisee created.2 43 Conse-
quently, the court left the door open for the franchisee to claim an
interest in the franchisor's goodwill, finding that the franchisee
may have purchased goodwill as part of the franchise package and
thereby helped develop that goodwill in the course of business.244
235. Id. at 1414.
236. Id. at 1413 n.28.
237. Id. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1233 (9th ed. 2009) (defining RPO as "falsely
representing another's product as one's own in an attempt to deceive potential buyers").
238. Camp Creek II, 139 F.3d at 1412.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 1413 n.28. For definitions of passing off and reverse passing off, see BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (9th ed. 2009).
241. Id. at 1219, 1233.
242. See, e.g., Andrea Fong, Hong Kong, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING LAW, supra note
169, at H.K.-1, -13 (noting that "[t]he goodwill of a business is a Common Law concept and is
protected by the law of passing off" and that the first party to establish a reputation in the
franchisor's name will hold the business goodwill and be protected from passing off); An-
dreas Neocleous et al., Cyprus, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING LAw, supra note 169, at CYP-I,
-24, -29 (delineating the Cyprus law on passing off-derived from the English common law-
and discussing how a Cypriot franchised business's goodwill is protected by that passing-off
law).
243. Camp Creek II, 139 F.3d at 1413 n.28.
244. Fong, supra note 242, at H.K-13 (discussing instances when a prospective franchisee
may have the goodwill, and recommending that the franchisor acquire that party's business
and goodwill). Logic indicates that for the more entrepreneurial franchisees, franchisee busi-
nesspersons built goodwill that they had an interest in, not that they increased the goodwill




Noncompete covenant cases offer dueling assessments of
franchising, similar to those furnished in trademark infringement
cases.245 In DAR & Associates v. Uniforce Services, InC.,2 46 the fran-
chisee, DAR, sought a declaration that a signed covenant not to
compete was void. The franchisor, Uniforce, argued that without
the noncompete covenant, the franchisee would be free to siphon
customers and goodwill from the franchisor. 247 Uniforce further as-
serted that the noncompete covenant was necessary to protect that
goodwill. 248
The court denied the franchisee's motion for summary judg-
ment.249 The franchisor had argued that the franchisee had not ob-
tained any specific rights in the franchise agreement pertaining to
goodwill. Like the court in Bray,250 the court bifurcated the goodwill
into (1) that which Uniforce had at the time DAR became a licen-
see,251 and (2) the overall "business goodwill" or "community good-
will" developed separately by DAR (thanks in part to the
franchisor's established systemic goodwill). Ultimately, the
franchisor was concerned that the franchisee's failure to comply
with the noncompete agreement would somehow taint the integrity
of its goodwill. 252 The franchisor therefore argued that enforcing
the noncompete agreement would prevent that from occurring,
and the court agreed.253
In Bandag, Inc. v. Jack's Tire & Oil, Inc.,254 the franchisor con-
tended that it would be irreparably harmed if the court did not
245. For a comprehensive discussion of noncompete covenants in the franchising con-
text, see Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition, supra note 5.
246. 37 F. Supp. 2d 192, 195-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
247. See id. at 198.
248. Id. In effect, the noncompete agreement was supposed to act as a placeholder for
the safekeeping of its goodwill, to prevent it from being further taken by DAR and being out-
competed in the Maryland market.
249. Id. at 204.
250. See Bray v. QFA Royalties LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1237 (D. Colo. 2007), discussed
supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
251. This refers to the goodwill associated with the franchised system's trademark, which
Uniforce retained as licensor and which DAR did not legally acquire as part of the license.
252. DAR & Assocs. v. Uniforce Servs., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Franchisor Uniforce's fear was that DAR would use the goodwill it developed, which over-
lapped and was inextricably linked with Uniforce's goodwill, to pull Uniforce's goodwill unto
itself (appropriate Uniforce's goodwill). The effect would be to reinforce franchisee DAR's
own goodwill and undermine Uniforce's. Id.
253. Id. at 198, 200.
254. 190 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1999).
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uphold the noncompete covenant; otherwise, the former fran-
chisee would be able to convert the franchisor's goodwill into good-
will for the ex-franchisee's new enterprise as a manufacturer using
compeTitor Michelin's premolded method.2 55 Unlike the court in
DAR & Associates, the Bandag court found for the franchisee.25 6 The
court stated that because the franchisor could not distinguish be-
tween goodwill stemming from the franchisor and goodwill created
by the franchisee, the franchisor could not establish irreparable
harm.2 57 Thus, the Bandag court recognized that the franchisee ob-
tained, with respect to the franchise agreement, some rights to the
franchisor's goodwill.2 58
This pro-franchisee reasoning is also found in a Canadian case
where a noncompetition provision was held to be too uncertain and
therefore unenforceable.259 A high-speed photocopy franchisee
sought rescission of its franchise agreement, and while the court
found that the franchisee had obtained substantially what it had
bargained for and that there was no fundamental breach of con-
tract, the court also concluded that the franchisor's inadequate sup-
port services were equivalent to outstanding royalty and advertising
fee arrears. 260 The franchisee thus did not owe royalties or fees to
the franchisor and, in fact, was entitled to a claim of constructive
trust for the business premises.261 The court even ruled that the
franchisee should be paid for the goodwill it built at the business
site:
255. See id. at 925-26.
256. Id. at 926.
257. See id.
258. The same interpretation is evident in holdings in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jiffy
Lube Int'l, Inc. v. Weiss Bros., 834 F. Supp. 683 (D.N.J. 1993). The court in Weiss Bros. found
that a particular covenant not to compete was closer to an agreement ancillary to a business
sale than to a covenant accompanying an employment contract. Id. at 691. It declared that in
essence, the franchise contract was a conveyance of the franchisor's goodwill to the fran-
chisee. Id. Therefore, when the franchisee terminates the franchise relationship, the goodwill
is reconveyed to the franchisor, and the noncompete covenant is required to protect the
goodwill after the reconveyance. Id.
259. See Magnetic Mktg. Ltd. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., 1991 CanLII 1, 55, 57
(Can. B.C. S.C.). The noncompetition clause stated that the franchisee must not
operate or do business under any name or in any manner, either as an individual,
agent, partner or as a shareholder, officer or director of a corporation, that might tend
to give the public the impression that it is operating a printing service, a Print Three Cen-
tre or a business similar thereto.
Id. at 55 (emphasis added). This language was far too broad and uncertain for enforcement
to occur.
260. Id. at 49.
261. Id. at 52 ("The landlord . . . is content to have [the franchisee] as its tenant.").
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Given the failings of [the franchisor] and the hard work of
[the franchisees] to become associated with [the] location, it
would constitute unjust enrichment for [the franchisor] to
regain control of those premises, cause the eviction of [the
franchisee] and obtain for itself whatever locational goodwill
may have been built up over the years.2 62
The line of reasoning used in noncompete covenant cases con-
siders a fundamental question: what exactly is a franchisor selling
when it grants a franchise? The franchisor in Employee Leasing Ass'n
v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc.263 argued that the sale of a franchise is the
same as the sale of goodwill. 264 There, the franchisee had informed
the franchisor that it intended to terminate the franchise agree-
ment and compete with the franchisor despite a noncompete cove-
nant.265 The franchisor went to court to enforce the agreement,
arguing that goodwill attaches to the franchisor's name and was a
major element of the sale of the franchise.2 66 Throwing the
franchisor's very words back at it,267 the court noted that the
franchisor's own franchise agreement proclaimed that all goodwill
belongs exclusively to the franchisor.2 68 Thus, the court rejected the
contention that goodwill had been sold to the franchisee. Seizing
upon the fact that under the franchise agreement, the goodwill
could be revoked at any time, the court concluded that goodwill
had been, instead, leased to the franchisee. 269 Although ruling for
the franchisee, 270 the Snelling & Snelling court held that goodwill
262. Id. at 51-52.
263. 732 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
264. Id. at 1041.
265. Id. at 1037.
266. Id. at 1041.
267. Presumably, the franchisor drafted the franchise contract. See Postal Instant Press,
Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 365, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Robert W. Emerson, Franchis-
ing and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1509 n.21 (1990)) ("Usually
[franchise agreements] are form contracts the franchisor prepared and offered to franchis-
ees on a take or-leave-it [sic] basis."). Indeed, regardless of whether there is the possibility for
negotiation, the worldwide norm is for the franchisor to draft and present the contract to the
franchisee. See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contracts and Territoriality: A French Compari-
son, 3 ENTREPRENEuRALL Bus. L.J. 315, 336 (2009) (noting that the French franchisor, like its
American counterpart, is responsible for drafting the franchise agreement).
268. Snelling & Snelling, 732 F. Supp. at 1041 n.9.
269. Id. at 1041.
270. The court appears to have founded its opinion, at least in part, on both statutory
and public policy grounds:
Since the plaintiffs have prevailed on the choice of law issue and demonstrated that
the covenant restraining competition in their franchise agreements with Snelling do
not fit into any of the statutorily or judicially created exceptions to section 16600 [of
the California Business and Professions Code], the Court hereby grants summary
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was severable from the trademark and that the franchisee had not
purchased the goodwill in the franchise agreement.2 71
E. Antitrust Tying
Franchisor contentions remain consistent in antitrust tying
cases.272 Franchisors reason that the trademark is inseverable from
the allegedly tied product,273 and because of this inviolable link,
there can be no tying.274 If the court nonetheless found tying, then
judgment to plaintiffs, denies Snelling's cross-motion for summary judgment and
holds that the restrictive covenants in this case are not enforceable against the plain-
tiffs. Even though the parties agreed to include such a covenant in their agreements,
enforcement of such covenants would violate a strong public policy in the state of
California of encouraging free competition in business endeavors.
Id. at 1045
271. Id. at 1041. See generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition,
supra note 5.
272. See BLACK'S LAw DIctiONARY 1660 (9th ed. 2009) (defining tying as "an arrangement
whereby a seller sells a product to a buyer only if the buyer purchases another product from
the seller").
273. Courts usually accept the franchisors' contentions. JAMES A. GONIRA & PETER R.
SILVERMAN, ANNUAL FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 233 (2012) ("Without
much success, franchisees and dealers have tried to raise tying claims under the Sherman Act
against franchisors."). In most cases, the franchisees cannot show that the franchisor has the
necessary market power to coerce franchisees to buy other items (the tied product) in order
to obtain the desired item (the tying product). See, e.g., BP W. Coast Prods., LLC v. Shalabi,
No. Cl1-1341MJP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82879, at *26 (W.D. Wash.,June 14, 2012) (citing
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) regarding the need for market
power, noting that market power is not demonstrated by a franchisor's being an "important
player" in its industry, Rick-Mik Enters. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 977 (9th Cir.
2008), and relying upon the basic proposition that a franchisor's power to make someone
buy a franchise cannot be based on power derived from a franchisor-franchisee contract
rather than the overall market for the franchise, Queen City Pizza, Inc., v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 443 (9th Cir. 1997)).
274. See Emerson, Franchising and Consumers' Beliefs About "Tied" Product, supra note 115.
See, e.g., Cal. Glazed Prods., Inc. v. Bums & Russell Co. of Balt. City, 708 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th
Cir. 1983) (finding that glazed masonry block producer's trademark and its component parts
were so interrelated in the consumer's mind as to be considered one product); Hamro v.
Shell Oil Co., 674 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the nexus between the Shell trade-
mark and the gasoline product was sufficiently close to treat them as one product); Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that ice cream
producer and retailer's trademark and products were "so inextricably interrelated in the
mind of the consumer as to preclude any finding that the trademark is a separate item for tie-
in purposes."); B-Dry Sys. of Kansas City, Inc. v. B-Dry Sys., Inc., No. 88-0653-CV-W-6, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17012, at *12 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 1990) (finding too many unresolved issues
of fact and law to grant a summary-judgment order against defendant-franchisor for allegedly
tying its trademark to the equipment comprising its waterproofing system); Smith v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (finding that defendant Mobil's gasoline
product is not separate from its trademark).
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the franchisor's fallback position would be that any such restric-
tions on the franchisee are essential to maintain a level of quality
throughout the franchise system.2 75
In California Glazed Products, Inc. v. Burns & Russell Co. of Baltimore
City, the franchisor insisted that consumers bought the finished
product (masonry bricks) because of positive attitudes toward the
franchisor and its products.276 The court determined that the trade-
mark and the products, including the tied products, were so inter-
connected in the minds of the consumers277 that they were parts of
a total franchise package and could not be considered two products
in terms of antitrust tying.278 The trademark identifies the origin of,
and attaches goodwill to, the total product.279 Thus, goodwill is in-
separable from the franchise package that is sold to the franchisee.
In Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., the franchisor
defended a tying arrangement by arguing that the tie-in was neces-
sary to maintain the quality expected by consumers.280 The court
agreed and stated that when one franchise is below the standard,
the franchisor and the entire franchise chain suffer a loss of con-
sumer goodwill. 28' Specifically, the consumer views one franchise
unit's lack of quality as a failure by the franchisor to police its fran-
chisees, and the consumer thereby generalizes his perception and
applies it to all other franchise locations. 28 2 On numerous occa-
sions, a franchisor, and subsequently a court, has recognized this
phenomenon and therefore tied together the trademark, the
system, and the goodwill. In California Glazed Products, Inc., for ex-
ample, the court concluded that the franchise package includes the
275. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033,
1040 (4th Cir. 1987) (ruling against appellant's business justification defense because less
restrictive measures were available to ensure quality control than requiring franchisees to
exclusively purchase replacement parts from the franchisor-distributor); Mozart Co. v. Merce-
des-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that defendant-
franchisor had a business justification to tie together Mercedes cars and their replacement
parts to assure quality control); Mobile Soft Ice Cream Truck Franchisees of Mister Softee,
Inc. v. Mister Softee, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 423, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding insufficient
evidence showing defendant-franchisor impermissibly required its Mister Softee franchisees
to purchase soft-ice-cream mix and other goods from franchisor).
276. Cal. Glazed Prods., Inc., 708 F.2d at 1429-30.
277. Id. at 1430.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1349.
281. See id.
282. See id. For a brief discussion of what constitutes franchisee free-riding, see supra note
23 and accompanying text; see also infra note 387 and accompanying text (discussing how the
franchisor and franchisee can, in their contract, restructure their relationship to meet con-
cerns such as free-riding).
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trademark, the underlying products, and the goodwill.2 83 A trade-
mark and goodwill thus become inseparable because the trademark
exemplifies the franchise's goodwill. 2 4
F. Vicarious Liability
Inconsistent arguments also arise when franchisees raise the issue
of vicarious liability in litigation. A court may hold a franchisor vi-
cariously liable for damage or injury caused by a franchisee if the
franchisor had the right to control the day-to-day operations of the
franchisee,285 or if the franchisor represented to the third party that
it was in control and the third party relied on that representation to
its detriment.28 6 Franchisors are vulnerable to claims of vicarious
liability because, to avoid losing their trademark rights, they have to
exert some degree of control over franchisees' operations. Trade-
mark rights can be lost through a naked license arrangement 2 7 or
due to improper licensing, such as when the trademark owner fails
to exert adequate quality control or to supervise the trademark's
use by a licensee.288 Because there is no clear line of supervision
beyond which a franchisor's measures of control will subject it to
vicarious liability, 28 9 franchisors and franchisees alike will manipu-
late the facts to support their respective arguments on vicarious
liability.
283. See, e.g., Tserpelis v. Mister Softee, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 423, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(holding that the trademark and the product are inseparable).
284. See id. (citing Indus. Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d
Cir. 1937)) ("Trademark epitomizes the goodwill of a business.").
285. See, e.g., Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Manis
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 185 S.E.2d 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971).
286. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 124 (Fla. 1995).
287. Also called a bare license, a naked license is revocable at will and does not cause a
property interest to pass to the licensee. BLACK's LAW DIcnoNARY 1002 (9th ed. 2009). In
effect, there are no controls over a naked license. Id. at 1004 (a naked license permits the
"licensee to use a trademark on any goods and services the licensee chooses"). See Finkelstein
& Bussert, supra note 192, at 39 (noting that a franchisor must not only have a right to
control but must exercise that right, or else the license might be a naked-hence invalid-
license, leaving the franchisor with an abandoned and unprotectable trademark).
288. Dawn Donut, Inc. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959)
("[U] nless the licensor exercises supervision and control over the operations of its licensees
the risk that the public will be unwittingly deceived will be increased and this is precisely what
the [Lanham] Act is in part designed to prevent.... Clearly the only effective way to protect
the public where a trademark is used by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative
duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.").
289. See Philip F. Zeidman, Franchising and Other Methods of Distribution: Regulatory Pattern
and Judicial Trends, 1714 PLI/CoRP 443, 712 (2009).
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In stark contrast to the antitrust cases, 290 the franchisor in Drexel
v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc. 29 defended a vicarious liability suit
by claiming that the franchisee was an independent contractor.
Here, the franchisee accidentally gave a lethal drug to the appel-
lant's husband. 292 The appellant claimed that the franchisor was vi-
cariously liable as "owner" of the franchise and argued that the
franchisor left itself open to liability as operator of the franchisee's
store.293 The appellant further claimed that the franchisor had led
the public to believe that it was dealing with a large national chain
or, at the very least, the employees and agents of that chain.2 94 The
franchisor countered that it did not maintain sufficient control over
the franchise to be held vicariously liable for the franchisee's acts.
2 95
The franchisor further asserted that the franchise agreement only
created an independent contractor relationship and not an em-
ployer/employee one. 296 Agreeing with the appellant, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that there was evi-
dence that the franchisor had made representations of agency or
authority to the public.
29 7
Unlike the antitrust cases, where franchisors usually emphasize
that a franchisee obtains goodwill through the trademark and con-
sumers buy products because of the franchisor's goodwill, the
franchisor in Drexel declared that it made no representations to the
public regarding the franchisee's product and attempted to disasso-
ciate its goodwill from the franchisee. 298 In contrast, the franchisors
in the antitrust cases avowed that goodwill could not be separated
from the trademark and thus attempted to associate the goodwill
with the franchisees. These contrary, internally conflicting view-
points leave franchisees in the dark as to what specific rights they
290. See supra notes 272-284 and accompanying text.
291. 582 F.2d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1978).
292. Id. at 783.
293. Id. at 784.
294. Id. See Emerson, Franchisors' Liability when Franchisees Are Apparent Agents, supra note
116 (discussing these beliefs and franchisors' vicarious liability for the acts of their
franchisees).
295. Drexe/ 582 F.2d at 786-87. The franchisor argued on appeal that that the franchisee
bore the risk of litigation and that an independent contractor relationship was formed via the
franchise agreement. Id.
296. Id. Numerous commentators and courts have outlined the difference between an
independent contractor relationship and an employer/employee relationship in terms of
liability. See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Independence: Awaiting Public Recognition
(Jan. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); King, supra note 116, at 461.
For further clarification on the employer/employee relationship in the context of liability,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006).
297. Drexel, 582 F.2d at 795-96.
298. Id. at 788.
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obtain in franchise agreements or, at least, what rights the
franchisor might concede were bestowed upon the franchisee along
with the franchise itself.
G. Tax Cases
In cases involving the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Com-
missioner), franchisors often offer arguments inconsistent with the
arguments discussed previously.299 In Lieb v. Commissioner, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) alleged that the franchisor was deficient
on its tax filing.300 The IRS's claim stemmed from a $300,000 credit
that the franchisor gave to the franchisee. 30 1 The franchisor argued
that the credit was in exchange for the franchisee's promise to ter-
minate litigation and to pay the remaining balance on a debt that
the franchisee owed to the franchisor.30 2 The franchisor claimed
that this credit was payment for the franchisee's goodwill and rea-
soned that by returning customer phone numbers and accounts re-
ceivable in exchange, among other things, the franchisee was really
selling goodwill, not returning what had always been owned by the
franchisor.30 3 The court held that the franchisee had no goodwill to
sell because all goodwill remains possessed by the franchisor. 3 4 Fol-
lowing reasoning similar to Snelling & Snelling,305 the court found
that goodwill was not part of the franchise package.306
In International Multifoods Corp., the franchisor, a U.S. corpora-
tion, sold its ownership interest in its foreign franchise operations
to a Japanese corporation, Duskin Company, 30 7  allocating
$1,110,000 of the sale price to goodwill.30 8 On its tax return, Duskin
299. SeeJefferson-Pilot Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 995 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1993); Int'l
Multifoods Corp. & Affiliated Cos. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 25 (1997); Canterbury v. Comm'r, 99
T.C. 223 (1992); Lieb v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1231 (1974).
300. Lieb, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1232 ("Respondent [IRS] determined corporate income
tax deficiencies and transferee liabilities in these cases as follows .....
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. The $300,000 credit did correspond to the debt of the franchisor. Id. at 1238.
Because of conflicting information at different stages of the negotiation-franchisor-fran-
chisee talks, the board meeting, and final settlement-both sides simply differed about that
for which the credit was in consideration. Id. at 1237-38. Only during the board meeting did
the representatives of the franchise parties discuss whether the $300,000 would be in ex-
change for the "goodwill" as encapsulated in the clientele information. Id. Goodwill was not
explicitly mentioned in the talks or in the settlement agreement. Id.
304. Id. at 1238.
305. See supra notes 263-271 and accompanying text.
306. Lieb, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1238.
307. Int'l Multifoods Corp. & Affiliated Cos. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 25 (1997).
308. Id. at 36.
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listed the monies received for the goodwill as foreign source in-
come for purposes of receiving a foreign tax credit.309 The IRS chal-
lenged this listing.310 At Tax Court, Duskin posited that the
goodwill was severable from the franchise and that any separate
monies received for goodwill from the franchisor should be consid-
ered foreign, rather than U.S., source income for tax purposes.3 11
The IRS contended that goodwill was inherent and not severable
from the franchise and that any sale of the franchisor's interest and
trademarks already included goodwill for purposes of U.S. source
income. 312 The court agreed, finding that the goodwill was "inextri-
cably related" to the franchise, 313 and, therefore, the former fran-
chisees had purchased a franchise package that already included
goodwill.3 1 4
Traditionally, goodwill is considered a nonamortizable intangible
asset.3 15 Under I.R.C. § 1253(d)(2) (A), however, the costs of the
trademark and the trade name are amortizable.316 Still, some courts
have held that a portion of the purchase price paid by franchisees
should be allocated to goodwill as an additional intangible asset not
encompassed in the trademark. 317 In Canterbury, however, the Tax
Court rejected this contention and held that there was no goodwill
separate from the franchisor's trademark.318 The franchisees in that
case had purchased a McDonald's and allocated a portion of the
purchase price to the franchise rather than to a separate good-
will.319 By doing so, the franchisees could write off, or amortize, that
allocated amount as an expenditure. The issue before the court was
whether the amount attributable to goodwill was also amortiza-
ble. 320 The IRS argued that the franchisees should have allocated
more to goodwill as a nonamortizable good, implying that goodwill
was a cost separate from the purchase price of the franchise.32'
The franchisees provided an expert, Patrick J. Kaufman, Ph.D.,
then an associate professor of marketing at Georgia State Univer-
sity, who concluded that "in the McDonald's system of restaurants,
309. Id.
310. Id. at 36-38.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 38-39.
313. Id. at 37.
314. Id.
315. See Canterbury v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 223, 247-48 (1992).
316. Id.
317. For a discussion of this argument (and a rebuttal of it), see id. at 248-49.
318. Id. at 249.
319. Id. at 224.
320. Id. at 245.
321. Id. at 247.
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there is no such thing as franchisee goodwill. '" 322 The court agreed
with the franchisees and said that the "goodwill inheres in the Mc-
Donald's trade name and trademarks,"3 23 thus implying there was
no goodwill independent of the franchise. 324 These franchisees
adopted a stance incompatible with the franchisee interest in cases
where franchisees usually attempt to sell the franchise for a price
that includes goodwill.
H. Equitable Estoppel
Collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel are venerable principles
regularly subject to judicial delineation. 325 To estop means that the
judge forecloses the supposed contradictions in legal proceedings,
with courts sometimes bringing into play quasi-estoppel and its
usual precursor, unconscionability. In most cases, the parties fail to
raise the issue of whether unconscionability is "fact" or "law," mak-
ing the court's treatment of it difficult to discern. 32 6 Indeed, creat-
ing the contours of estoppel in a way that balances the
countervailing policies raised in a claim is a query particularly
within the court's competence.327 Courts sometimes use estoppel as
a self-protective measure, invoking it even where it has not been
322. Id. at 251.
323. Id. at 249.
324. Id. (quoting Montgomery Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1318,
1331-32 (1980)) ("Anything resembling goodwill attaches solely to the national company
and the name of the product.., the value of goodwill, and the franchise are so interrelated
as to be indistinguishable, all the value should then be assigned to the franchise.").
325. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (ruling that judicial estoppel
bars contradictory positions taken on boundary interpretation); Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d
1209, 1242 (Haw. 1998) (considering judicial estoppel to preclude inconsistent positions on
standing to sue); see also Payne v. Cartee, 676 N.E.2d 946, 950 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (res
judicata). If a court cannot determine inconsistencies from the record, it should deny a pre-
trial motion for dismissal, but more evidentiary materials can be garnered to support the
defense. See Meeks v. Dashiell, 890 A.2d 779 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (affirming denial of
summary judgment based on judicial estoppel).
326. See Willard v. Ward, 875 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994) (determining judi-
cial and quasi-estoppel as a matter of law); Stimpson v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 S.W.2d
944, 946 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). See also USH Ventures v. Global Telesystems Group, Inc., 796
A.2d 7, 19 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (discussing the defense of unconscionability under the
UCC and in other contract actions as based on precepts that are equitable in nature). For the
purpose of determining a standard of review, at least one court has called unconscionability a
factual matter. SeeJamison v. Consol. Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978).
327. Cf. Romero v. Bank of the Sw., 83 P.3d 288, 297 (N.M. 2003) (ruling that the applica-
tion of clean hands in the interests of justice is for judicial decision). See also Pavel Enters.,
Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co., Inc., 674 A.2d 521, 533-34 (Md. 1996) (equating the promissory
estoppel element of the prevention of injustice with unclean hands, a determination that is a
legal question for the court). The "law" versus "fact" inquiry should be informed by consider-
ation of whether judge and jury are each performing those functions that the judge or jury is
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raised as a defense. 328 Equitable estoppel32 9 preserves the integrity
of the courts330 by precluding inconsistent results in litigation,
thereby making precedent more predictable while deterring repeti-
tive litigation.331
Equitable estoppel is also intended to promote fair play332 and
protect weaker parties. 333 In furtherance of these goals, some courts
will deny the defense of estoppel to parties that have "unclean
hands,"334 as in SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
thought best to handle. See T. Leigh Anenson, Creating Conflicts of Interest: Litigation as Interfer-
ence with the Attorney-Client Relationship, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 173 (2006) (proposing greater judicial
cognizance of certain policy issues within a claim for litigious interference with the attorney-
client relationship, and further stating that elaborating on which standards of conduct
govern in a particular set of circumstances is a question for the judge and determining what
relevant events have occurred is normally a function of the jury).
328. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 266 S.W. 313, 317 (Tenn. 1924); MELVILLE M. BIGE-
LOW, A TrATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL, OR OF INCONTESTABLE RIGHTS 763 (James N.
Carter ed., 6th ed. 1913); T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel
Under a Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 633, 666-67 (2007) (citing AFSCME
Int'l Union v. Bank One, NA, 705 N.W.2d 355, 362 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)); Rosalind Poll,
Note, He Who Comes into Equity Must Come with Clean Hands, 32 B.U. L. REv. 66 (1952)).
329. The Connecticut Supreme Court set forth a basic definition: "Equitable estoppel is a
doctrine that operates in many contexts to bar a party from asserting a right that it otherwise
would have but for its own conduct." Glazer v. Dress Barn, 873 A.2d 929, 947 (Conn. 2005).
See also Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation with a
Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel,
Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, "Mend the Hold," "Fraud on the Court" and Judicial and Eviden-
tiary Admissions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 589, 633 (1998) (stating that "privity of the parties, reliance,
and prejudice, [are] generally recognized elements of equitable estoppel" (footnotes omit-
ted)). See generally Anenson, supra note 328; T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable
Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REv. LmTG. 377 (2008).
330. Anenson, supra note 328, at 663 (citing Zechariah Chafee,Jr., Foreword to EDWARD D.
RE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQun-y (1955)).
331. Anenson, supra note 328, at 666 (citing Decker v. Vt. Educ. Television, Inc., 13 F.
Supp. 2d 569, 573 (D. Vt. 1998)); Davis v. B & S, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 707, 711 (N.D. Ind.
1998)).
332. Anenson, supra note 328, at 663 (citing In re Lyon, 882 A.2d 1143, 1151 (Vt. 2005)).
French law also provides for the notion of equitable estoppel. In 2010, France's highest civil
court considered the appeal of an arbitration case concerning the contract between a French
company and a German company for the packaging of veterinary products. The Cour de
cassation clarified the concept of estoppel by noting that estoppel prohibits a party from
invoking an argument that is inconsistent with the party's own behavior and upon which
another party has thereby altered its position. That is, a party must raise arguments which are
consistent with, or at least not contradictory to, the party's own actions. Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., Feb. 3, 2010, Bull. civ. I, No. 08-21288
(Fr.). See also Olivier Vibert, Prcisions sur la Notion d'Estoppel d Ia Franfaise, FiNYEAR (Apr. 8,
2010), http://www.cfo-news.com/Precisions-sur-a-notion-d-estoppel-a-la-francaise-al4266.
html.
333. Anenson, supra note 328, at 663 (citing B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc. v. Wedgeworth, 911
So. 2d 483, 493 (Miss. 2005)).
334. See, e.g., Haynes Trane Serv. Agency, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 573 F.3d 947, 958
(10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
franchisee relief under the equitable-estoppel doctrine based on the theory of unclean
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Canada.335 In SunAmerica, a senior user of a trademark wrongfully
sought to appropriate the goodwill that a junior user had estab-
lished . 36 The senior user of the trademark countersued the junior
user for infringement. The junior user argued that the senior user's
counterclaim should be estopped because the senior user had ac-
quiesced to the use of its mark by the junior user.3 3 7 The court held
that the existence of customer confusion 338 revived the senior user's
counterclaim from estoppel. 339 The court noted, however, that this
mechanism of revival should be denied in future cases to senior
users who come to the court with unclean hands, "wrongfully seek-
ing to appropriate the goodwill of the junior user's mark."340
In Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. ,34 franchisee
Pinnacle and franchisor Little Caesar each accused the other of
poaching goodwill in the way foreshadowed by the SunAmerica
court. Pinnacle alleged that during its time as a franchisee of Little
Caesar, it developed an advertising concept using the phrase "Hot
N' Ready" that was highly successful with customers. 342 Pinnacle
also alleged that, after allowing Pinnacle to develop and strengthen
the "Hot N' Ready" concept for three years, Little Caesar wrongfully
began using the concept without Pinnacle's consent.343 Invoking
laches, Little Caesar insisted that Pinnacle should be estopped from
objecting to its use of the "Hot N' Ready" concept because Pinnacle
"chose to sit on its hands and watch without protest as [Little Cae-
sar] spent millions of dollars promoting" the concept.3 44 The court
held that questions of material fact existed as to whether equitable
hands, where a franchisee demonstrated untrustworthiness by his misrepresentations and
omissions).
335. 77 F.3d 1325, 1336 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996).
336. Id. See also Iowa Health Sys. v. Trinity Health Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 897, 925-26
(N.D. Iowa 2001).
337. SunAmerica Corp., 77 F.3d at 1334.
338. SunAmerica brought federal unfair-competition and trademark-infringement claims
and related state-law claims against Sun Life of Canada, alleging that Sun Life of Canada's
use of the marks SUN LIFE (U.S.) and SUN LIFE, without any reference to the geographic
modifier "of Canada," was causing unacceptable marketplace confusion. See id. at 1330.
339. Id. at 1329-30.
340. Id. at 1336 n.4 (noting that courts are "able to fashion injunctive relief that avoids
the unjust enrichment of a predatory senior user"). See also Iowa Health Sys., 177 F. Supp. 2d at
925-26.
341. 598 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2010).
342. Id. at 972.
343. Id. at 975.
344. Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 786, 798 (D.S.D.
2008), affd, 598 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2010). The laches and limitations arguments of Little
Caesar were upheld, as Pinnacle's October 2004 suit against Little Caesar was found to have
been filed more than six years after the South Dakota franchise law's six-year period for
bringing an action under that Act or for breach of contract. Little Ceasar, 598 F.3d at 974-79.
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estoppel applied and accordingly denied both parties' motions for
summary judgment on Little Caesar's equitable defense. 345
In some equitable estoppel cases, a viable argument persists that
some franchisors, because of their contradictory claims, may be es-
topped from denying to franchisees their own portion of the good-
will. As noted, the franchisor typically asserts exclusive ownership of
the franchise's goodwill. Yet when tort plaintiffs aver that the
goodwill or trademark has led them to patronize and detrimentally
rely on the product or services of a particular franchise, the
franchisor denies any vicarious liability, often leaving the franchisee
solely responsible for any injuries resulting from the franchise
system.346
Thus, a contradiction in logic arises. When a franchisee performs
well, the franchisor claims the exclusive benefit inuring to the
goodwill of the franchise; when a franchisee performs otherwise,
the franchisor accepts no responsibility for the ensuing bad will.
34 7
Tort plaintiffs have contended that franchisors should be estopped
from denying responsibility for franchisee negligence 3 48 a doctrine
known as agency by estoppel. 349
345. Little Caesar, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 798. Franchisor Little Caesar, however, won the case
both at the federal district court on summary judgment and then on appeal. The estoppel
argument it advanced was merely an alternative defense, and the appeals court upheld the
lower court's grant of Little Caesar's counterclaim for breach of the franchise agreement and
concluded that Pinnacle had no claim for a Little Caesar breach of contract, for a franchisor
violation of the South Dakota Franchise Act, or for cancellation of Little Caesar's federal
trademark for the phrase "Hot N' Ready." Little Caesar, 598 F.3d at 978-82 (citing S.D. CoDI-
FIED LAws § 37-5A-66(7) (2004) (repealed 2008)).
346. For more on vicarious liability cases, see supra notes 285-298 and accompanying
text. A fair distinction must be drawn between negligent acts associated with the franchise
system and those that are not. See, e.g., Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 1293 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (affirming a directed verdict in the plaintiffs' suit against Good Humor franchisor
after a plaintiff's child was struck and killed by a motorist while crossing the street for ice
cream); Fitz v. Days Inns Worldwide, Inc., 147 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming
the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit against the franchisor for a hit-and-run accident on the
sidewalk of a franchisee's hotel).
347. See, e.g., Allen v. Choice Hotels Int'l, 942 So. 2d 817 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (assigning
no liability to the franchisor in a wrongful death action where the franchise agreement was
merely the means by which uniform service and public goodwill toward the franchise system
was maintained).
348. See, e.g., Butler v. McDonald's Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.R.I. 2000) (allowing
plaintiff's suit against franchisor McDonald's for hand injuries sustained after a franchisee's
cracked door shattered while plaintiff entered a restaurant); Reagin v. Terry, 675 F. Supp.
297 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (overruling ajury verdict in favor of a plaintiff suing a franchisor for a
robber's assault on the plaintiff in a franchisee-owned service station); Hayman v. Ramada
Inn, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting plaintiffs suit against franchisor
Ramada Inn, Inc. for failure of the franchisee to provide adequate security or notify plaintiff
of the crime rate in the hotel's vicinity).
349. Agency by estoppel
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In Brook v. Nutri/System, Inc., the defendant franchisor denied any
liability in a wrongful death lawsuit when a woman died after partic-
ipating in a diet program operated by one of its franchisees. 350 The
franchisee's telephone directory listing, advertising, sign frontage,
and products were listed under the name of or supplied by Nutri/
System as required by a franchise agreement. 351 Moreover, the dece-
dent's husband testified that she had not sought out the franchisee,
Thin, Inc., but rather Nutri/System because of the latter's guaran-
tee of weight loss.3 52 In fact, a franchisee co-owner testified that 99
percent of the franchise's clients were unfamiliar with the Thin,
Inc. name. 353 As a result, the district court denied a summary judg-
ment motion by Nutri/System, finding that ajury may find for the
plaintiff on an agency by estoppel theory.354
By denying that it bore responsibility for the products sold under
its trade name, the franchisor implicitly recognized that the fran-
chisee plays a role in the franchise system independent of the
franchisor, its trademarks, and its goodwill. In tort cases such as
Nutri/System, the franchisor takes an advantageous position, for pur-
poses of agency and tort law, which denies liability355 but in doing
so unwittingly acknowledges that there may be goodwill owned by
the franchisee and distinct from the franchisor's interest in the
trademark.
protects third parties who justifiably rely on a belief that an actor is an agent and who
act on that belief to their detriment. The doctrine is applicable when the person
against whom estoppel is asserted has made no manifestation that an actor has author-
ity as an agent but is responsible for the third party's belief that an actor is an agent
and the third party has justifiably been induced by that belief to undergo a detrimen-
tal change in position. Most often the person estopped will be responsible for the
third party's erroneous belief as the consequence of a failure to use reasonable care,
either to prevent circumstances that foreseeably led to the belief, or to correct the
belief once on notice of it .... The operative question is whether a reasonable person
in the position of the third party would believe such an agent, as the actor appears to
be, to have authority to do a particular act.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 cmt. c (2006) (further noting that a person's scope
of power to bind the allegedly estopped party is determined according to the doctrine of
apparent authority, as provided in the RF.STATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006)).
350. Broock v. Nutri/System, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 7, 7-8 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
351. Id. at 9, 11.
352. Id. at 11.
353. Id. He testified in his deposition: "If you ask [ninety-nine] percent of the clients if
they have ever heard of Thin, Inc. [the franchise owner], they would say no." Id. Nothing in
the record indicates how the deponent came to that conclusion; presumably, it was simply his
business experience in owning and operating the franchise.
354. Id.
355. See generallyJennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of
Vicarious Liability, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 111, 126 (Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (discussing




Like most estoppel claims, reliance is a key factor. The reliance
must be detrimental 56 and reasonable. 357 The great lengths to
which franchisors go to create uniformity in both services and ap-
pearance likely aid in reliance claims since customers often cannot
differentiate between company-operated 358  and franchisee-run
locations. 359 Arguably, the same uniformity builds the goodwill asso-
ciated with the franchise, as customers link their satisfaction to the
trademark or other aspects of the system, instead of to individual
franchisees.
To aid in the application of vicarious liability claims in agency by
estoppel cases, Joseph H. King, Jr., an eminent professor on tort
law, proposed that such liability should be limited, in part, to
franchisors who do not take reasonable steps to post clear notices
that a location is in fact operated by a franchisee, not the
franchisor. 360 Such notification would deflate third-party plaintiffs'
arguments that they were ignorant of the independent operation of
the franchised location, eliminating any basis for showing a
detrimental reliance.3 6'
Likewise, such disclaimers would likely dispel franchisor conten-
tions that all goodwill benefits only the franchisor and its trade-
marks, because customers could draw a distinction between
franchisor and independent contractors, allocating some goodwill
356. See Sean Obermeyer, Note, Resolving the Catch 22: Franchisor Vicarious Liability for Em-
ployee Sexual Harassment Claims Against Franchisees, 40 IND. L. Rrv. 611, 623 (2007).
357. SeeJohn L. Hanks, Franchisor Liability for the Torts of Its Franchisees: The Case for Substi-
tuting Liability as a Guarantor for the Current Vicarious Liability, 24 OKLA. Crry U.L. REV. 1, 14
(1999).
358. "Company-operated" denotes units directly owned and controlled by the franchisor.
Most franchisors have a comparatively small percentage of units that they themselves own
and operate. BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 165, at 87-88, 90 (estimating that franchisors
retain, as owner-operators, an average of about 15 percent of the units; the percentage can
vary depending on the franchisor and its own sense of what is an optimal division between
the number of franchisor-run and franchisee-run units). In practice, the percentage of cor-
porate-owned units can vary from none to well over 50 percent. Id. at 89-90 (noting, from a
dataset of 1,158 franchisors, that 28 percent of the franchisors owned no units although-as
indicated in the data-over 10 percent of the franchisors owned more than half of their
networks' units). See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 10. Of course, if a company controlled all its
units (e.g., bought all franchises back), then as a definitional matter, it is no longer a
franchisor. Some brands are often erroneously presumed to be franchised. Starbucks Coffee
International, for instance, "does not franchise operations and has no plans to franchise in
the foreseeable future." Starbucks Investor Relations: Investor FAQ STARBUCKS, http://investor.
starbucks.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=99518&p=irol-faq#26956 (last visited July 3, 2012) (noting,
however, that it does have some franchises under the name "Seattle's Best Coffee").
359. Obermeyer, supra note 356, at 611, 625; Emerson, supra note 10 (discussing nearly
fifty questions that collectively demonstrate the public's continuing lack of knowledge about
franchising and indicate that people are no more informed about franchising now than they
were ten or twenty years ago).
360. King, supra note 116, at 461.
361. Id. at 463-64.
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to the franchisee. Again, this highlights the correlation between
franchise goodwill and consumer reliance at the heart of agency by
estoppel cases. Typically, plaintiffs claim that they relied on the
goodwill of the franchisor in patronizing a franchisee. Franchisors
only claim the exclusive benefit of that reliance, however, when a
purchase results in a positive sale-as expressed in further good-
will-but not when the result is a negligence lawsuit. Again, equita-
ble estoppel arises.
III. PROPOSAL
Grace is given of God, but knowledge is bought in the market.362
Surveys show that consumers are often confused about the con-
trol that a franchisor has over its franchisees and whether a particu-
lar business even involves a franchisee. 63 With all of the uncertainty
that persists in consumer perceptions, it naturally follows that, in
many if not most situations, consumers frequent franchised busi-
nesses not because of the particular franchisee but because of the
trademark and what that trademark represents." 4 One can imagine
a sliding scale where the stronger a franchisor's established good-
will is-say, that of McDonald's-the less likely it is that the fran-
chisee will build his own goodwill. If the franchisee does generate
his own goodwill in these cases, it is probably because he built
upon365 the already-established goodwill of the franchisor. 366
362. ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH, POEMS OF ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH 229 (Forgotten Books
2010). (from his 1848 poem, "The Bothie of Tober-na-Vuolich").
363. See Emerson, Franchising and Consumers' Beliefs About "Tied" Products, supra note 115;
Emerson, Franchisors'Liability When Franchisees Are Apparent Agents, supra note 116. The author
conducted similar research in 2000 and in 2008 that confirmed the previous results-most
people do not understand the distinction between franchises and company-owned busi-
nesses. Of those who do, many still do not know the legal consequences of franchise status,
such as limited or no franchisor liability for most contract breaches or torts committed by the
local franchisee. Emerson, supra note 10.
364. Finkelstein & Bussert, supra note 192, at 3-4 ("Goodwill in a trademark develops as a
result of favorable consumer recognition and association.").
365. For less established trademarks, the franchisee may justifiably claim that it had little
to build from and that its goodwill is largely a product of its own efforts as opposed to the
franchisor's efforts. This is discussed infra notes 372, 374-376 and accompanying text.
366. Of course, a franchisee may contend that the reverse has happened: the franchisee
has built goodwill and is thus entitled to compensation for having to give up the franchise.
Commentators have noted that "the corporate franchisor can capture the goodwill of the
small business [the franchisee] who got the customer in the first place." Paul Steinberg &
Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REV.
105, 223 (2004). See also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gallo GMC Truck Sales, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 810,
814 (D.N.J. 1989) ("Once a franchisee has succeeded, through the expenditure of his own
efforts and capital, to establish a local reputation for the franchise name, his franchise is
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It can therefore be argued that, in paying fees to a franchisor, a
franchisee is paying to use the goodwill. 367 It is therefore a logical
assumption that a more experienced, long-lived franchise with es-
tablished goodwill requires higher franchise fees than a start-up
franchise that has yet to develop much goodwill.3 6 s Indeed, as the
Trevisan case portends in French law,369 one may find that in the
United States, the local clientele, which belongs to the franchisee, is
composed of consumers, while the national clientele, which be-
longs to the franchisor, comprises all of the franchisees
themselves.3 70
On the other end of the scale, the less established the
franchisor's goodwill-such as for many small, start-up franchises-
the more one could expect franchisees to build their own goodwill,
which, if managed properly, will concurrently reinforce that of the
franchisor.37' Although there are circumstances where customers
associate their goodwill toward a franchised business with the
specifics of an individual franchisee,3 72 those instances are atypical,
vulnerable to termination."); Magnetic Mktg. Ltd. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., 1991
CanLII 1, 52 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (holding that a franchisee should be paid for the goodwill it
created at its franchised store location), discussed supra notes 259-262 and accompanying
text; Steinberg & Lescatre, supra, at 223-24 ("The nature of a franchise/dealership agree-
ment is such that the upfront costs of acquiring the customer may be borne by the small
business, but the gains accrue to the corporate giant.").
367. In re Floan & Copperart Pty Ltd., slip op. at 56 (Fed. Ct. New South Wales Dist., Aug.
9, 1990) (LEXIS, Commonwealth & Irish Cases Combined File).
368. See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 26, at 517. See also Kabir C. Sen, The Use of Initial
Fees and Royalties in Business-Format Franchising, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 175, 180
(1993). But see Tarique Hossain & Sijun Wang, Franchisors Cumulative Franchising Experience
and Its Impact on Franchising Management Strategies, 15J. MARKETING CHANNELS 43 (2008) (con-
cluding that fast-food and restaurant industry data suggest that as a franchisor's cumulative
franchising experience rises, the franchisor is more likely to (1) offer less support to franchis-
ees, (2) charge lower royalty and franchise fees, (3) sign longer-term contracts with
franchisees, (4) mandate stricter start-up training for franchisee employees, and (5) display
decreased propensity to expand franchise networks).
369. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court forjudicial matters] 3e civ., Mar. 27, 2002,
Bull. civ. II, No. 00-20732 (Fr.).
370. See SIMON, supra note 49, at 264 n.599.
371. See Rajiv P. Dant et al., Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels, I1J. PuB. POL'Y &
MARKETING 33, 36 (1992).
372. Imagine that a new corporation with little goodwill starts franchising. In year one, it
allows a franchisee to open a location in a new part of the country. This location is wildly
successful and acquires many new and frequent customers in the metropolitan area where it
is located. Customers appreciate the local staff and the charisma of the franchised location's
owner. The owner is also a philanthropist who is very involved in the local community, which
also brings in more business. Before the new location opened, customers in that metropoli-
tan area were unfamiliar with the company. Now, a few years later, the franchisor has decided
to terminate the franchise agreement or not renew it, and thus the franchisee sues for cus-
tomer goodwill. Should that franchisee not be entitled to any of that goodwill? That is the
singular difficulty with my proposal, described infra, but I believe these circumstances are
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especially in larger, standardized franchise systems.373 For example,
assume that a customer lives in Gainesville, Florida and always goes
to a certain franchise chain store there but then moves to Jackson-
ville, Florida and tries the same franchise chain. Assume further
that the customer finds the individual franchised business in Jack-
sonville to be horrible; he might still have goodwill toward the
franchised outlet in Gainesville, but obviously not for the one in
Jacksonville. How discerning is that customer? In the evidently in-
frequent case where the customer really comes to see key differ-
ences between superficially identical stores,374  the franchisor
goodwill is also derived from a franchisee's activities rather than
just the franchise trademark.
Indeed, the franchise trademark does not always matter. There
likely are some instances, albeit perhaps uncommon in the franchis-
ing context, where the customer only goes to a specific franchisee
because of, for example, the friendly, efficient employees of that
franchisee or the site of that franchisee's business. For example, the
customer knows a regular caf6 that she would visit regardless of the
owner or operator so long as the coffee was good, or a hairdresser
that she would patronize no matter where or for whom the hair-
dresser worked. In either of those situations-visiting a franchised
enterprise because of its employees or its location 375-the customer
patronizes the franchised business for reasons completely apart
from the system's overall reputation, its trademark, or other conno-
tations associated with the franchisor or its chain-style business as a
whole. A franchise chain may have multiple franchisees in one
town, all of them offering the same product, but consumers tend to
patronize one of the franchisees more than the others because that
specific franchisee offers something better-be it superior, safer
service; more knowledgeable and helpful employees; or simply the
relatively rare, and any resulting injustice could be averted, for the most part, via strong
disclosures to prospective franchisees.
373. See generally Emerson, Franchising and Consumers' Beliefs About 'Tied' Products, supra
note 115.
374. See infra notes 375-376 and accompanying text.
375. Courts have addressed how the goodwill associated with a business site the fran-
chisee operates may be severable and separately valuable to the goodwill that attaches to the
system's trademark. See Ad. Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1978) (noting that
the franchisee built up the goodwill at its franchise site), discussed supra notes 73-77 and
accompanying text; Magnetic Mktg. Ltd. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., 1991 CanLII 1, 52
(Can. B.C. S.C.) (holding that a franchisee should be paid for the goodwill it created at its
franchised store location), discussed supra notes 259-262 and accompanying text; supra notes
29-33, 47-50, and accompanying text (discussing the French law effective grant of local
goodwill rights to franchisees).
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very basic accommodation of easier entrance and egress.3 76 Even if
the franchisee were not accorded rights to goodwill in a future sale
or termination of the business, the superior franchisee still benefits
from higher revenues compared to its intrabrand rivals. That itself
can be an incentive toward, and reward for, franchisee productivity.
This Article proposes that courts apply a single standard for all
franchise cases, one that takes consumer perceptions into account.
Because of consumers' existing confusion between franchisee-run
businesses and company-owned businesses, courts should adopt the
position that goodwill cannot be separated from the trademark and
that it is purchased by the franchisee as part of a franchise package.
This position more accurately portrays the franchisor-franchisee re-
lationship in the minds of consumers and accords with how
franchisors market business-format establishments.
A consumer who is unable to decipher what products are regu-
lated by the franchisor and what products are left to the discretion
of the franchisee will more easily associate any goodwill with the
trademark that adorns the structure of the franchise. By adopting a
standard that holds goodwill inseverable from the trademark, simi-
lar to the view of most tax courts,377 court decisions will more accu-
rately reflect the perceptions of consumers and produce more
regularity and efficiency in the marketing of franchises themselves.
Advisory materials for franchisors have suggested ways to imple-
ment such a standard.378 For example, if it is explicitly stated that all
376. An example would be a customer's choice to frequent a closer store with smoother
traffic patterns and more parking spaces. But this process of choosing between units may
occur more often and perhaps in a more idiosyncratic fashion than one might imagine.
Surely some consumers prize factors in intra-brand competition besides just proximity. A law
student shared with the author how his mother, in California, will visit different locations of
the same fast-food system to determine which is better. Once she determines which unit
provides her the best service, including the tastiest food and the largest portions, that unit
becomes the only one she frequents, even if she must go miles out of her way (sometimes
twenty-five miles or more) to visit that particular store. The student's mother has turned what
for others may simply be last-minute, one-at-a-time decisions into what for her constitutes an
ironclad commitment (a calculated assessment of a meal choice for life); surely she is unu-
sual, but likely not unique.
377. See supra Part III.G.
378. One commentator has proposed the following:
Acknowledge who owns the goodwill Expressly state that the phone number, operations
manual, confidential information, and business goodwill are owned by the franchisor.
Specify that all manuals be returned upon termination of the agreement. Specify that
the phone number be transferred to the franchisor upon termination. An argument
that all parties contemplated that the goodwill (which the franchisor is seeking to
protect through non-compete litigation) belonged to the franchisor will resonate with
a judge.
John Edward Connelly, Ten Rules for Franchisors to Reduce Litigation Risks, 14 LJN's FRANCHIS-
ING Bus. & L. ALERT, Jan. 2008, at 1, 4.
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goodwill is associated with the trademark and not the franchisor, a
franchisee may feel less manipulated when a relationship ends and
he is not compensated for goodwill.3 79 That would especially be the
case if disclosures to prospective franchisees explicitly state that the
franchisee will own no goodwill related to the business, at least with
respect to the franchisor or any other owner of trademark rights
related to the business.
The proposed treatment of goodwill likely would lead parties to
make adjustments and would ultimately improve the franchise rela-
tionship. For franchisors who do not actually own the trademark,380
a franchisor would be free to adjust its contract with the trademark
owner, as this Article's proposal only governs the franchisor-fran-
chisee relationship. The risk that a franchisee would not work to
build the business in the final months or years of the franchise term
acts as a counterweight to the proposal's pro-franchisor (or other
licensor) characteristics. Surely franchisors could structure
franchise agreements and operations manuals to provide incentives
for franchisees to continue working hard for the franchise system.
Moreover, if a franchise merits renewal, the parties' shaping of a
renewed relationship could occur sooner.
For those who argue that goodwill is made up of three compo-
nents-the site, the brand (which is more thanjust the trademark),
and the guarantee of repeat business attributable to the operator-
this approach to goodwill as a matter of business reality has faced
serious practical problems in terms of its legal application. A rule
about ownership of franchise goodwill may, in fact, create incen-
tives for the parties either to pattern their relationship in line with
this new, simple legal principle, or-more likely-to take this
clearly delineated line of "title" to the goodwill and make practical
adjustments reflecting the parties' needs. The parties presently
have a number of expectations about goodwill, which-given the
breadth, vagueness, or elasticity of the relevant law-may well lead
to false assumptions and inefficient behavior. With a clear, firm
379. Franchise disclosure rules could require the franchisor to inform potential franchis-
ees that any trademark is owned and controlled by the franchisor and that the goodwill goes
with that trademark. Such regulation would likely be unnecessary, however, as typical
franchisors want to assert such ownership in most situations, and thus already have an incen-
tive to admonish franchisees about the franchise's intellectual property tights and use of the
goodwill resting with the franchisor. Other mechanisms may better serve the franchisees'
long-term interests, such as a consent clause in which the franchisee-in return for acknowl-
edging the franchisor's control over the goodwill-obtains the franchisor's agreement that it
must have the franchisee's consent to any assignment of the franchisor's interest in the
franchise-related trademarks. See infra notes 401-403 and accompanying text.
380. These franchisors are licensees with the right to grant sublicenses to franchisees.
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standard, the parties can, if they so choose, simply adapt their be-
havior to that benchmark or reach contractual adjustments in line
with the parties' own views of what constitutes an optimal
arrangement.
These efficiencies could be furthered by a very strong disclosure
regime. The Federal Trade Commission rule on franchising man-
dates numerous disclosures to potential franchisees, but nothing
about goodwill.38' Even without such mandatory disclosures, warn-
ings could come from the franchisor to would-be franchisees either
in the contract form itself or in other voluntary disclosures.3 8 2 But a
warning would certainly be more meaningful if accompanied by a
statement from the Federal Trade Commission that the franchisor
is entitled to precondition the grant of a franchise on the
franchisor's complete ownership of all goodwill generated by the
franchised business. The franchisee would have to sign separately
the franchisor's stipulation about goodwill, with that proviso includ-
ing a declaration that any exception to absolute franchisor owner-
ship must be specified in writing and be separately signed or
initialed by both parties. To avoid the problems that would occur if
a small, territorially limited franchisor pocketed the goodwill cre-
ated by pioneer franchisees, 38 3 the good faith underlying a contrac-
tual proviso reserving all goodwill to the franchisor could be judged
by these standards: it cannot bind franchisees for a business brand
that (1) is still new (e.g., under eighteen months old), or (2) is
expanding into virgin territory without survey evidence indicating
that the brand is widely recognized there. 384 In other nations, the
381. 16 C.F.R. §§ 436-437 (2007) (entitled "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising"). Federal regulations used to require certain disclosures related to
goodwill and business opportunities in franchising. 16 CFR § 437.1 (a) (15) (viii) (2008) (pro-
viding, until this provision was revised in 2010, that when "advertising, offering, licensing,
contracting," selling or otherwise promoting a business opportunity, the seller or broker of
that opportunity would commit an unfair or deceptive act if it did not disclose "the condi-
tions under which the business opportunity seller may repurchase, whether by right of first
refusal or at the option of the business opportunity seller (and if the business opportunity
seller has the option to repurchase ... whether the repurchase price will be determined by a
predetermined formula and whether there will be a recognition of goodwill or other in-
tangibles associated therewith")).
382. Supra note 378 and accompanying text.
383. Supra note 372 and accompanying text.
384. For example, the survey could show that a significant percentage of the population
in that territory were customers of that brand elsewhere. This survey would not be an oner-
ous burden-indeed, likely not even an extra expense-because it is presumably something
an expanding franchisor would conduct as part of its marketing plans.
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regulatory environment recognizes that franchising simply should
not occur until pilot operations have succeeded. 38 5
Franchises should always benefit both the franchisee and
franchisor, and placing all of the goodwill in the trademark lessens
tensions and encourages cooperation and a more successful
franchise as a whole. Indeed, if the courts attach goodwill to the
trademark, rather than to the franchisor or the franchisee, both
parties might benefit. For example, a Quizno's franchisee gains
from having a nationally recognized, high-quality trademark. The
franchisee also profits from the cooperation and assistance of other
Quizno's franchisees. After all, in this scenario, it is in the interest
of all Quizno's franchisees to help one another and continue to
add to the goodwill of the franchise system as a whole. The
franchisor also reaps rewards: the franchise's goodwill will likely be
enhanced and franchise and company stock prices will likely in-
crease if individual franchisees work together to achieve the goal of
a successful franchise system. This system could even help the judi-
cial system and future litigants because the application of a uniform
standard in attaching goodwill to the trademark would lead to con-
sistent results. This, in turn, could bring greater predictability and
reduce the likelihood of lawsuits and backlog in the courts. 38 6
If goodwill were consistently held inseverable from the trade-
mark, judicial decisions in franchise disputes would become more
consistent, with similar fact patterns leading to similar results. For
example, in both Bandag, Inc. v. Jack's Tire & Oil, Inc.38 7 and DAR &
Associates v. Uniforce Services., Inc.,388 discussed previously, the
franchisor maintained that failing to enforce a covenant not to
compete against a former franchisee would harm the franchisor's
goodwill. 3 9 In both cases, the franchisor was essentially arguing
385. In France, for example, an essential element of franchising is savoir-faire, which
requires the franchisor to first operate successfully in order to be assured of having the con-
tinuous transmission of know-how that is a required element of the franchise relationship.
Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Savoir-Faire: Clueless in America? (Dec. 15, 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author). Moreover, a number of other nations specify testing
requirements. Italy requires a franchisor to test its formula on the market before selling to
franchisees, and Romanian franchisors "must operate the business for an unspecified period
of time prior to expansion." ELIZABETH CRAWFORD SPENCER, THE REGULATION OF FRANCHISING
IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 259 (2010). China's franchise laws include a "two plus one"
rule that a franchisor must operate two stores for at least one year before selling any
franchises. Id. This rule is also found in some trade association codes of conduct, such as
those in Egypt and Malaysia as well as for the European Franchise Federation. Id. at 259-60.
386. Other examples could easily be imagined. See infra text accompanying note 403.
387. 190 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1999). See also supra notes 263-268 and accompanying text.
388. 37 F. Supp. 2d 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). See also supra notes 246-252 and accompanying
text.
389. See Bandag, 190 F.3d at 926; DAR & Assocs., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
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that the franchisee had never obtained any rights to goodwill in the
first place. Though the facts in these cases were similar, the court in
DAR & Associates held in favor of the franchisor3 90 and the court in
Bandag held in favor of the franchisee. In the latter case, the
franchisor had not distinguished its goodwill from that retained by
the franchisee and therefore could not establish irreparable
harm.391 The Bandag court implied that the franchisee might have
developed goodwill during his employment and, if he had, that
goodwill would belong to him and not to the franchisor. If the
court in Bandag had before it a clear rule or precedent that good-
will is inseverable and always retained by the franchisor, it would
have reached the same result as the court in DAR & Associates.
Two other cases with similar facts but different outcomes are Pap-
pan Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardee's Food System, Inc. 392 and Computer Cur-
rents Publishing Corp. v. Jaye Communications,3 93 both discussed above.
In both cases, the franchisor contended that its goodwill would be
irreparably harmed if the franchisee were permitted to continue
unauthorized use of the franchisor's trademark.394 The court in
Pappan Enterprises held in favor of the franchisor.3 95 In rejecting the
franchisee's assertion that he would suffer the loss of customer
goodwill if enjoined, the court held that "[t]he concept of custom-
ers' goodwill in the context of trademark law is goodwill for the
mark, not for the specific restaurant."3 96 The court in Computer Cur-
rents held in favor of the franchisee, finding that an injunction
would irreparably harm the franchisee because it would cause the
franchisee to lose "the good will [the franchisee] has cultivated." 397
Under the rule that goodwill is inseverable from the trademark and
remains with the franchisor, the result in Computer Currents would
have been the same as that in Pappan Enterprises, because the court
in Computer Currents could not have found that the franchisee devel-
oped its own goodwill or retained any goodwill after the franchise
relationship was terminated.
Some franchisees might worry that vesting all goodwill in the
trademark would put them at a disadvantage should the franchisor
assign its rights to a new franchisor with a bad or poorly established
390. DAR & Assocs., 37 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
391. See Bandag, 190 F.3d at 926.
392. 143 F.3d 800 (3d Cir. 1998). See supra notes 119, 195, 210-213 and accompanying
text.
393. 968 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ga. 1997). See supra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
394. See Pappan Enters., 143 F.3d at 803; Computer Currents, 968 F. Supp. at 689.
395. Pappan Enters., 143 F.3d at 806-07.
396. Id. at 806.
397. Computer Currents, 968 F. Supp. at 690.
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reputation; indeed, the new franchisor's identity could have ex-
tremely deleterious effects on the franchisee's ability to attract and
retain customers. Where the risk to them is so high, franchisees
would argue that they should be given some measure of control.
Under a typical franchise agreement, however, the franchisee has
little to no power over whether or to whom the franchisor may as-
sign its rights as franchisor; indeed, about three-fourths of franchise
agreements expressly state that the franchisor is entitled to assign
that agreement to another party,398 while franchisees almost never
have a corresponding right to assign. 399 The franchisor is free to sell
the business to a party whose name, reputation, conduct, location,
or business practices could negatively affect the trademark.
The franchising parties' own contract clauses can resolve this
concern over a new franchisor's identity and reputation. 400 Fran-
chisees could be given a stake in the trademark in the form of a
consent clause-either in the original franchise agreement or in a
purchase agreement with the new franchisor-which would require
the franchisor to obtain franchisees' consent to any assignment of
the franchisor's interest. In International Multifoods Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, the franchisor assigned its rights to a Japanese company and,
in response to concerns that franchisees would be unwilling to work
with a foreign franchisor, made the sale subject to franchisees' ap-
proval.40 1 The purchase agreement included a clause requiring the
franchisor to obtain franchisees' consent to the assignment of
franchisor's interest.40 2 Making the sale of the franchise and its
goodwill to a new franchisor subject to approval by some share of
the franchisees (or at least subject to a right, upon notice, for fran-
chisees to object) gives the franchisee a stake in the trademark and
thus in the business's goodwill.40 3 If, for purposes of legal interpre-
tation, legal goodwill were placed within the McDonald's or
Dunkin' Donuts trademarks, franchisee owners would presumably
398. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 37, at 970 (66 percent of franchise
contracts examined in 1993); Emerson, supra note 10 (77 percent of franchise contracts
examined in 2011).
399. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 37, at 969-70 (95 percent of franchise
contracts examined in 1993 involved a franchisor's right to first refusal over a franchisee's
proposed transfer of the franchise, and 93 percent of those contracts required that franchis-
ees get franchisor approval before selling or assigning the franchise); Emerson, supra note 10
(100 percent and 99 percent respectively of franchise contracts examined in 2011).
400. See supra note 380 and accompanying text (a paragraph dealing with how the
franchisor and franchisee can, in their contract, restructure the relationship to meet con-
cerns such as free riding).
401. Int'l Multifoods Corp. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 25, 32 (1997). See supra note 119; infra
note 406; supra notes 315-320 and accompanying text.
402. Id.
403. See supra text accompanying note 393.
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have one more reason to work hard to meet the standards that Mc-
Donald's or Dunkin' Donuts is known to have, and the franchisors
would benefit by having their franchisees cooperate. The increased
value of the trademark increases both the value of the individual
franchised units and of the system as a whole.
CONCLUSION
The franchise relationship originates in a contractually imposed
demarcation of rights and responsibilities, all ostensibly arrived at
with knowledge, consent, and-sometimes-negotiations. 40 4 Surely,
in most cases, franchisors and franchisees are capable of continuing
in that vein-resolving difficulties through private dialogue, not a
litigated debate. As problems arise, the parties can harness their
already-demonstrated abilities to reach a consensus and continue
their business relationship, if for no other reason than pecuniary
self-interest; at least that is the case most of the time.40 5 Franchisors
and franchisees do frequently disagree, however, with one common
point of contention being the ownership of goodwill.
The courts also render inconsistent decisions, which offer parties
little insight into (1) whether goodwill is severable from the
franchise and therefore not necessarily sold to the franchisee, or
(2) whether goodwill is inseverable from the franchise (in effect,
from the trademark accompanying the franchise) ,406 and thus is
part of a franchise package that the franchisee purchases. Inconsis-
tencies in arguments about goodwill ownership produce incoher-
ent judicial and administrative holdings and sometimes foster
inefficient, or even disingenuous, decision making by franchisors
404. Emerson, supra note 91.
405. See Kevin Adler, Getting Ahead of the Legal Curue, LJN's FRANCHISING Bus. & L. ALERT,
Feb. 2007, at 1 (recommending that franchisors and franchisees work together, anticipating
new laws and developing procedures to implement changes in a cost-effective, goodwill-maxi-
mizing fashion rather than waiting until legislation, regulation, or adjudication forces their
hands). For an apparently successful exercise of franchise system-wide negotiations, see Da-
vis, supra note 107.
406. See Int'l Multifoods Corp. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 25 (1997) (holding that goodwill in a
Mister Donut business in Asia and the Pacific was inseverable from the franchisor's trade-
marks, discussed supra notes 307-312); Canterbury v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 223, 247, 248 (1992)
(finding that the expectancy that customers would return for repeat business-or goodwill-
is created by and derives from McDonald's name and trademark, also discussed supra text
accompanying notes 318-328). There are also cases stating the proposition that goodwill is
embodied in the trademark, although this may not be considered synonymous with the idea
that the two are inseverable.
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and franchisees. 4 7 By taking into account the actual attitudes and
perceptions of the key party in the relationship408-the franchised
business's customers-the franchisors, the franchisees and, most
importantly, the courts can focus on the factors to invoke when
resolving franchise disputes about goodwill.
407. See, e.g., Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.
1989). The court disparaged the franchisees' failure to abide by the franchise agreement,
which led to their termination, followed by a wasteful, frivolous, protracted lawsuit; the fran-
chisees wrongfully tried to use the franchisor's trademark (and its goodwill) as a bargaining
tactic. See supra notes 151-158 and accompanying text. The franchisees were rebuked for
taking the trademark hostage, and their termination was upheld. Id. Another example is that
of Sparks Tune-Up Centers, Inc. v. Strong, No. 92 C 5902, 1995 WL 153277, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
6, 1995), discussed supra note 213.
408. This includes, for example, having goodwill attached to the trademark. See supra text
accompanying note 386.
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